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RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC FORUM: COURTS MUST STAND
FIRM AGAINST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DISPLACE
DISSIDENCE

Chris Ford*
Dissent is what rescues democracyfrom a quiet death
behind closed doors.'
I.

Introduction

As the twenty-first century gets underway,
governmental authorities appear to be undertaking
increasingly unfriendly measures against citizens who take
to the streets to influence policymaking.
In some
jurisdictions, for example, courts have given authorities the
green light to stifle speech by limiting access to public
spaces. 2 In one recent case involving the 2004 Republican
National Convention in New York, a district court judge
seemed more worried about the condition of the grass in
Central Park than the right of the citizenry to gather in a
public space and conduct a rally. 3 Particularly in this age
*Civil rights practitioner, Law Office of Chris Ford, www.cfordlaw.net;
J.D., Southwestern University School of Law, 2005; Bachelor of Arts,

Economics, Stanford University, 1984; Editor-in-Chief, Southwestern
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 2004-2005; former
journalist with the Los Angeles Daily Journal legal trade newspaper.
The author also has written on the right of free expression under
Argentine constitutional and international law for the Supreme Court of
Argentina in an article that will be published in La Ley. The author
wishes to thank Southwestern law professor David C. Kohler for his
'uidancein the preparation of this article.
Lewis Lapham, Foreword to HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, THE ASSAULT ON
FREE SPEECH, PUBLIC ASSEMBLY AND DISSENT:
A NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD REPORT ON GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (The North River Press

2004).
2See, e.g., United for Peace & Justice v. Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d 255
(N.Y. Gen. Term); Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York,
331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
3 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
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of globalized media outlets and big-money political
campaigns, which in concert tend to considerably constrain
the range of debate, 4 an important component of the health
of American democracy is the general public's ability to
make their grievances known by taking to the streets
without undue governmental hindrance. The general public
represents that vast majority who lack the means to convey
their message via the media or directly to lawmakers. 5
This escalating government clampdown on free
expression, along with current trends toward privatization
of public functions, 6 governmental secrecy, 7 and gagging
4 Media

consolidation recently has drawn criticism. A bid during 2003
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to allow large
media companies to own television and radio stations and newspapers
in the same cities provoked protests in more than a dozen U.S. cities,
with marchers in Los Angeles displaying signs that read "No Choice,
No Voice: Reclaim our Airwaves." Furthermore, 750,000 Americans
phoned, wrote, or e-mailed messages, arguing that the proposed rule
changes would stifle diversity and were fundamentally anti-democratic.
The FCC ignored these messages. Steve Barnett, On Broadcast:
Hurrahfor Jowell as She Puts Brakes on Big Media, THE OBSERVER,
June 29, 2003, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Madison Smart Bell, Have You Heard the New Neil Young Novel?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 33 (noting that musician Neil Young is
"not the first or last to notice that if our world is significantly less free
now than in the time of his youth, it's less because of government than
the inert momentum of the increasingly monolithic media.").
5 See infra notes 18, 60-73 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part V.C.
7 This nation now holds some trials in secret.
One newspaper
columnist points out that "a tiny group of fringe right-wing lawyers"
created secret and unaccountable military tribunals controlled by the
White House that have proven "totally useless" in the war on terror, but
have "indelibly stain[ed] America's reputation as a leader in democratic
principles and endanger[ed] the lives of American prisoners of war in
current and future conflicts." Robert Scheer, The Man Behind the Oval
Office Curtain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at B 11. Furthermore, the
federal government has been operating under ever-greater secrecy in
recent years, especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington, D.C. For example, the number of
classified government documents has jumped forty percent between
2001 and 2003. Moreover, in 2003 only one fifth as many documents
were declassified as in 1997. Edward Epstein, White House Takes
Secrecy to New Levels, Coalition Reports, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2004,
at A7.
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of citizens, 8 should give anyone who favors governance by
open democracy serious pause. Though perhaps not
fashionable to emphasize in this era of magnified terrorism
fears, evidence is abundant that the polity's rights are
steadily eroding. "The war on terrorism threatens to
destroy the very values of a democratic society governed
by the rule of law." 9 In light of recent mass arrests and
secret detentions by the federal government, Judge
Tashima, who was imprisoned in an internment camp in
Arizona along with other Americans of Japanese ancestry
during World War II, said, "It's happening all over
again.' 0
Professor Don Mitchell argues that the
[President George W.] Bush has.., presided over one of the
most closed administrations in modem history, increasing the
classification of documents and defending against any
challenges to its secrecy. Early in his tenure, [former Attorney
General John] Ashcroft issued a memorandum to other
agencies of government promising to stand by any plausible
refusal of a Freedom of Information Act request.
Editorial, Administration Unbound, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 2,
2004, at 16A. In addition, hearings for immigrants caught up in the
sweeps following the September 11, 2001 attacks were closed to not
only the news media and the public, but even the detainees' relatives.
Adam Clymer, Government Openness At Issue as Bush Holds On to
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al. The details of their arrests
and even the number detained have been kept secret. Id. Bush also has
kept under wraps presidential papers pertaining to his father, George
H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan, robbing scholars and the public of
valuable information. Id. In general, the Bush Administration's
"penchant for secrecy ... has been striking to historians, legal experts
and lawmakers of both parties." Id.
8See infra Part III.
9Steve Hymon, Rights a Victim of Terror War, U.S. Judge Says, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B3 (quoting United States Court of Appeals
Judge A. Wallace Tashima, speaking at a conference on the civil rights
cases challenging the World War H-era internments) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
10Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Tashima also criticized
the government for interrogating people based only on race and for
conducting searches of Internet, library, and university records without
probable cause. Id. Another former detainee at an internment camp
told the newspaper, "A lot of people now are governed by fear. There
are friends of mine who say racial prejudice can be justified .... They
really believe it. It's scary the way things are going. But I think people

3
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intersection of the new repressive state apparatus spawned

by the September 11, 2001 attacks on American soil, along
with jurisprudence that defines where free speech may take
place, "portends a frightening new era in the history of
speech and assembly in America."'"
Protecting core rights such as free expression is
vital because "[s]ometimes a right, once extinguished, may
be gone for good."' 12 Recognizing that the right to free
speech for dissidents is increasingly at risk in the United
States, this article catalogs manifold methods the
government has employed to constrain free speech. It
urges that courts not only serve as a bulwark against further
erosion of public expression of dissent but endeavor to
restore access to the public forum that recently has been
lost. Part II surveys the background of the right of free
expression, examining the traditional limits on the public
forum. Part III provides details and examples of the
government's increasing tendency to suppress dissident
expression by deploying heavily-armed police in
demonstrations, committing violent acts against peaceful
protesters, engaging in mass arrests, exaggerating the
criminal charges against detained demonstrators, and
holding demonstrators in ignominious conditions for
unreasonably long periods of time. Part IV examines how
such government actions violate constitutional protections
of speech by deterring participation in public debate. In
recent years, the government has gone beyond such street
tactics and has placed public fora off-limits by forcing
dissenters into protest pens, determining, based on
viewpoint, where they may engage in political expression
and limiting the landscape of free speech via privatization
Part V analyzes the First Amendment
schemes.
are going to be outraged sooner or later." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

11Don Mitchell, The Liberalizationof FreeSpeech: Or, How Protest in
12Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

PublicSpace is Silenced, 4 STAN. AGORA 1, *45 (2004).
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implications of such developments, and Part VI concludes
that courts must defend the right to free expression by
limiting or disallowing these governmental schemes that
have the effect of restricting access to the public forum.
II. Background
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution 3 represents "nothing less than a celebration of
the value of intellectual and moral autonomy."' 14 Our
nation's founders believed that democratic government
would only be possible with the widest access to
information. 15 This belief reflects the self-governance
theory underlying the First Amendment tradition, whereby
free speech is viewed as an indispensable tool for
governing a democracy. Because it facilitates the spread of
political truth, free speech receives heightened protection. 16
13The First Amendment provides in relevant part:

"Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST., amend. I.

14 Sheila Suess Kennedy, Introduction to FREE EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xviii (Sheila Suess Kennedy ed.,

Greenwood Publishing Group 1999).
15/d.

16According

to one author,

The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One
of the most important purposes of society and government is
the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general
concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited
discussion, for ...once force is thrown into the argument, it
becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false
side or the true, and truth loses all its natural advantage in the
contest.
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31
(Harvard Univ. Press 1948); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN

OPEN SOCIETY 12 (Random House 1992). Professor Smolla lists five

ways in which free speech is related to self-governance: (1) through
participation (debating issues, casting votes, joining decision-making
processes); (2) the pursuit of political truth; (3) augmentation of

5
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A variation on this theory posits that the right of free

expression is needed for citizens to develop the intellectual
tools necessary to assimilate and evaluate a wide range of
viewpoints.17 Additionally, commentators have cited the
marketplace theory as an underlying purpose of free speech
by which truth competes in the marketplace with falsity and
ultimately triumphs. 18 Free speech also is often justified as
an end unto itself, inextricably tied to human autonomy and
dignity. 19 Thus, under this self-fulfillment theory, even
where one's words may lack truth, value, or argumentative
merit, free expression offers the speaker fulfillment through
20
inner satisfaction and the realization of self-identity.
Whatever its true raison d'etre, free speech on issues of
public concern has enjoyed protection for hundreds of years
and has as its conceptual progenitor the right to petition
majority rule; (4) restraint on "tyranny, corruption and ineptitude"; and
(5) societal stability. Id. at 12-13. See also New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (declaring that "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
overnment and public officials").
"By allowing for ambiguity and conflict in the public sphere, the
First Amendment promotes the emergence of character traits that are
essential to a well-functioning democracy, including tolerance,
skepticism, personal responsibility, curiosity, distrust of authority, and
independence of mind." GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 7 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004).
18 "Truth has a stubborn persistence. Persecution may eliminate all
visible traces of a truth, like the scorched earth after a napalm bombing.
Yet truth comes back.... Cut down again and again, truth will still not
be stamped out; it gets rediscovered and rejuvenated, until finally it
flourishes." SMOLLA, supra note 16, at 7. However, Professor Smolla
argues that like economic markets, the marketplace of ideas suffers a
bias in favor of the wealthy who have greater access than the poor or
disenfranchised. Id. at 6. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market").
19 SMOLLA, supra note 16, at 9.
20 It is a right defiantly, robustly, and irreverently to speak one's mind,
just because it's one 's mind." Id.

6
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government for redress of grievances,
developed in Medieval England.

as originally

A. The Right of Free Expression: Ancient
Roots
The right of free expression as a means toward
effecting change in governmental policy predates the
founding of the United States. Although the Magna Carta
contains no language directly protecting free speech, some
authors suggest that it contains the seeds that later
flourished into support for free-speech rights. 2 1 These
seeds take the form of the right to petition the governing
authority for redress, which finds some reference in the
Magna Carta 22 but more direct support in later texts. 23 Yet,
The most salient feature in its seeds-of-free-expression context is that
the Magna Carta enunciates a limit on the power of the Crown.
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1. "However unarticulated, there is in the
Charter the principle that we today would call the 'rule of law."' A.E.
21

DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY

23 (Univ. of

Va. Press 1964). According to Howard:
The very fact that the King was forced to agree to this
declaration of rights and liberties set an example that could
never be erased. In a later century when Stuart kings, to cloak
their tyranny, invoked the doctrine of 'Divine Right,' men
could look back to Magna Carta as a reminder that free men
are not obliged to allow themselves to be ground into the dust.
Id.

22 According

to one author, who cites an unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, the right to petition predates even the Magna Carta. While
the King regularly provided redress, he only provided redress when
beneficial to himself and only under a very limited set of
circumstances-namely in private disputes between property owners.
Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigal Constitution: The History and
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153, 2163
n.26 (1998). Thus, this early petition for redress was not a means to
bolster political rights or affect policy. Id. at 2163-64. On the other
hand, the Magna Carta does provide, in Chapter 61, a means of
petitioning by which barons could seek that the King abide by the
Charter. See id. at 2164 n.29. The King and his counselors had
discretion over how to treat petitions, but even those rejected or not
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around the time of the Magna Carta, the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances became a formal
mechanism by which the disenfranchised could participate
with the enfranchised in English political life.24 Not
surprisingly, the right to petition began early in North
America when it was codified in the Body of Liberties
adopted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641.25
acted on had to be read. Id. at 2168. The Magna Carta provides:

[I]f We, Our Justiciary, bailiffs, or any of Our ministers offend
in any respect against any man, or shall transgress any of these
articles of peace or security, and the offense be brought before
four of the said twenty-five barons, those four barons shall
come before Us, or Our Chief Justiciary if We are out of the
kingdom, declaring the offense, and shall demand speedy
amends for the same.
supra note 21, at 50 (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 61).
E.g., The Bill of Rights of 1689, quoted in Michael J. Wishnie,
Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667, 685).
This bill gave subjects the right to petition the King, and declared that
"all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." Id.
at 685 n.92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Mark, supra note 22, at 2169. Mark observes:
HOWARD,
23

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for example, an
extremely wide band of English society participated in politics
by petitioning for redress of grievances, without question a
wider spectrum of society than that with the franchise.... A
petition from a group of prisoners, for example, suggests a
participatory consciousness that extended well beyond even
that which underlies some quite modem concepts of
enfranchisement.
Id. at 2169-70.
25 See Wishnie, supra note 23, at 688. The Body of Liberties provides:
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free
shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, Councell, or
Towne meeting, and either by speech or writing to move any
lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any
necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information,
whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance, so it [can] be
done in convenient time, due order, and respective manner.

8
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Not unlike today's demonstrators who take to the
streets to protest war, economic injustice, or environmental
degradation, those who petitioned the govermnent in
Colonial America were among the disenfranchised.26 Also,
like street marching today, petitioning in colonial times
made it possible for even the disenfranchised to participate
in political life.27 Furthermore, like some street
demonstrations carried out by the disenfranchised and their
28
sympathizers in the 1960s, as well as more recently,
petitioning during colonial times successfully effected
changes in governmental policy. 29 The Declaration of
Independence also refers to unsuccessful petitions for
redress from the King of England made "in the most
humble terms," but which "have been answered only by
repeated injury.' 30 Finally, the First Amendment itself
provides for petitioning. 3 1 Although originally seen as
central to the relationship between government and the
governed, the courts and academics historically have paid
A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New
England (December 1641), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION

122, 124 (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., ed., 1963). See also Mark, supra note
22, at 2177.
26 Wishnie, supra note 23, at 686-87. "Disenfranchised white males,
such as prisoners and those without property, as well as women, free
blacks, Native Americans and even slaves, exercised their right to
petition for redress of grievances." Id. at 688-89 (citations omitted).
Id. at 687.
28 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The First Annual Peter Cicchino Awards
for
Outstanding Advocacy in the Public Interest Pannel Discussion: A
Defender of Humanity: In Honor of Peter Cicchino, 9 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 45, 47 (2001) (rallying against global
economic inequality allows participants to feel a connection with "the
subordinated and disenfranchised whose humanity is routinely
denied").
29 For example, more than half the statutes enacted in eighteenthcentury
Virginia began as petitions. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 687.
30
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
31"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I (emphasis added).

9
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this aspect scant attention. 32 For practical purposes, the
First Amendment's protection of petitioning has been
33
subsumed into its defense of speech and the press.
"[W]here once political speech had petitioning at its very
core, and what we understand as speech and press stood34 at
the periphery, now the core and periphery are reversed.",
Giving historic context to and underlining the
importance of free speech in America, colonists in the early
1720s, writing under the pseudonym "Cato," explained:
Freedom of Speech is the great Bulwark of
Liberty; they prosper and die together. And
it is the Terror of Traytors and Oppressors,
32

Mark, supra note 22, at 2155.

" Id. at 2154-56. A narrow exception to this trend arose during the
1960s with the development of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, named
for two Supreme Court cases, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Gary Minda, Interest
Groups, PoliticalFreedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 908-10, 913
(1990). Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court, citing the right to
petition as "an essential component of our representative government"
under the First Amendment, immunized from antitrust attack
petitioning (i.e., lobbying) by business special-interest groups, even
where the purpose of such petitioning was to restrain trade and even if
the restraint caused an antitrust injury. Id. at 909-10, 913. Professor
Minda questions the validity of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
however, when he states:
The true threat to the values of free expression and
representative government lies not with antitrust regulation of
petitioning, but rather with antitrust immunity, which has
allowed the political process to be overwhelmed by the
excessive influence of corporate greed and private access.
By immunizing government-petitioning cases under the
Noerr-Penningtonantitrust doctrine, the courts have allowed
business interests to use political expression as a predatory
strategy for capturing the benefits of regulation, thus
threatening the political legitimacy of government.
Id. at 1028.
34 Mark, supra note 22, at 2154.

10
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. But when

[free speech] was enslaved... [t]yranny had
usurped the Place of Equality, which is the
Soul of Liberty, and destroyed publick
Courage. The Minds of Men, terrified by
unjust Power, degenerated into all the
Vileness and Methods of Servitude: Abject
Sycophancy and blind Submission grew the
only means of Preferment, and indeed of
Safety; Men 35durst not open their Mouths,
but to flatter.
Yet, intellectuals of the time frequently followed the
teaching of eighteenth century English commentator,
Blackstone, whose conception of free expression consisted
of barring government from prior restraint of speech while
allowing subsequent punishment. 36 Arguably, this type of
thinking underlies the passage of the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798, 37 which punished, inter alia, criticism of the
government. 38
These Acts, passed amid a looming
35 Letter

from Cato number 15, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same
Is Inseparablefrom PublickLiberty, in KENNEDY, supra note 14, at 15.
36 See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:

FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW

182-

83 (Rowman & Littlefield rev. ed. 1994).
The liberty of press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints on
publications, and not in freedom for criminal matter when
published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity.
Id. at 182 (quoting

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE

(1866)).
37 Law of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Law of July 14, 1798, ch.
74, 1 Stat. 596 [hereinafter Law of July 14, 1798].
38 The Sedition Act punished any act wherein a person should "write,
print, utter or publish.., any false, scandalous or malicious writing or
LAWS OF ENGLAND
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prospect of war against France, provoked immediate public
furor. 39 Thomas Jefferson assailed the constitutionality of

the Acts-rightfully so according to author Chafee-so
much so that when he became the nation's third President
in 1801, he pardoned all prisoners arrested under these
Acts. 40 Popular indignation with prosecutions under the
Party, and Congress repaid all
Acts destroyed the Federalist
41
fines.
of the imposed
Despite this history, the United States Supreme
Court has never passed on the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, 42 and for nearly the first century and a
half of its existence, the Court expended little effort on
examining or upholding free speech or free press rights.43
One reason the Court rarely reached First Amendment
writings against the government . . .with intent to defame ...or to
excite against them. . . the hatred of the good people . . . or to stir up
sedition" with up to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. Law of July
14, 1798, §2. Truth was a defense. Id. at §3.
39 WOLFE, supra note 36, at 183. The passage of the Acts represented
the one instance from the founding of the nation until 1917 in which the
government attempted to apply the doctrine of bad tendency, which
punishes speech that tends to favor an enemy at war by creating
disaffection in the country and discouraging men from enlisting in the
armed forces. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 25-28.
40 CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 27-28.
41Id. at 27. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
42 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. "Although the Sedition Act was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in
the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act
of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional." Id. (citations
omitted).
43 E.g., WOLFE, supra note 36, at 183 ("The period between 1800 and
1919 was generally dormant for free-speech cases on the federal court
level."). However, it is not as though the Supreme Court never referred
to free-expression rights in the 19th century. See, e.g., United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) ("The right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers
or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national
citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by,
the United States."); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80 (1873)
("The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
...are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.").

12
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questions during the nineteenth century is that the prospect

of mob violence or economic punishment discouraged
parties from asserting their rights to free speech in any
court. Thus, few cases or controversies regarding speech
made their way to the Supreme Court. an
Indeed, it was not until well into the twentieth
century that Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States,45 presaged the Court's modem

tendency to give teeth to First Amendment protection of
expression. Justice Holmes wrote, "I think that we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe." 46 This dissent
appeared in one case among a series in which both agitators
against the World War I draft and Socialists, who
advocated the violent overthrow of the government, were
hauled into court for violating the Espionage Act of 191747
and a similar state statute. Once there, their convictions
48
were
upheld.
Evenasina the
1925 case
of Gitlow
v. New
York, 49
which serves
free-speech
milestone
by holding

44See generally Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom
of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 268-70
(1986) (noting that economic and social pressures kept plaintiffs from
taking free speech cases to court in the 19th century). For example, in
1869 the New York Times sent riflemen and machine guns to protect the
Herald Tribune from a mob, and employers purportedly threatened to
eliminate employees' jobs if William Jennings Bryan was elected
president in 1896. Id. at 268 n.21, 269 n.22. Nevertheless, evidence
exists that newspapers did not exactly feel "shackled" by the Supreme
Court's nineteenth century free speech jurisprudence. Id. at 270-71.
Moreover, nineteenth century procedural and substantive rules
prevented many cases from reaching the Supreme Court, and the Court
did not "incorporate" the First Amendment into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment until 1925. Id. at 267-68.
45 250 U.S. 616.
46

Id.at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

47 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, amended by the

Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75 § 1, 40 Stat. 553.
48 See, e.g., Abrams, 250 U.S. 616; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
49 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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for the first time that the First Amendment was
"incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause 50 and was therefore applicable to the states,
the majority held that legislatures could prohibit classes of
speech that they consider to be dangerous. 5 ' Justices
Holmes and Brandeis dissented, pointing out that "[e]very
idea is an incitement." 52 This paved the way for the latter's
seminal concurrence in Whitney v. California.53 There,
Justice Brandeis enunciated the clear and present danger
50 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.

For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.
Id. While debating the Bill of Rights, the House of Representatives
approved a provision stating that "[n]o State shall violate the equal
rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases." Gibson, supra note 44, at 268 n.18 (quoting 1 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS 755 (J. Gales ed. 1834)). However, the Senate rejected
the provision. Id. (citing 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1146 (McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing
1971)).
51According to the Court:
[W]hen the legislative body has determined generally, in the
constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a
certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they
may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance
coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to
bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration.
It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that
the use of the language comes within its prohibition.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
52 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Every idea is an incitement. It
offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other
belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its
birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the
result.").
13 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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test as a limit on government prosecution of speech,
such
54
repression."
justify
can
emergency
an
that "[o]nly
Justice Brandeis further emphasized that those who
won the nation's independence believed that "without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine. 55 This call
to limit government sanction of speech would not really
strengthen until the 1960s. 56 During the Great War Era,
Learned Hand, sitting as a district court judge, most
eloquently defended the right of free speech in an
Espionage Act case in which he issued an injunction
requiring the postmaster to distribute a magazine
57
containing anti-war poetry, cartoons, and other writings.
54

Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
" Id. at 375.
56 See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning
Ohio law punishing advocacy of violence as a means to achieve
industrial or political reform); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (enunciating
the actual malice standard in defamation of public figures); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (reiterating that the teaching of the
moral propriety or necessity for a resort to force are not sufficient for
conviction). In Brandenberg, Justice Douglas criticized the courts for
too readily punishing advocacy by characterizing it as a threat.
Brandenberg,395 U.S. at 454-55 (Douglas, J., concurring). According
to Justice Douglas,
When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how
the 'clear and present danger' test has been applied, great
misgivings are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but
always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to
the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous.
Second, the test was so twisted and perverted in [Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)] as to make the trial of
those teachers of Marxism an all-out political trial which was
part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded substantial
parts of the First Amendment.
Id. at 454.
57 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F.
24 (2d. Cir. 1917). Chafee considers that during the World War I era,
there was "no finer judicial statement" advocating the right of free
speech than this from Judge Hand. CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 46.
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Judge Hand wrote:
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses
or the convictions it engenders, may in fact
stimulate men to the violation of law.
Detestation of existing policies is easily
transformed into forcible resistance of the
authority which puts them in execution, and
it would be folly to disregard the causal
relation between the two. Yet to assimilate
agitation, legitimate as such, with direct
incitement to violent resistance, is to
disregard the tolerance of all methods of
political agitation which in normal times is a
safeguard of free government. The
distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but
a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for
freedom.58
B. The Need for Free Expression: The Lack
of Alternatives
Certainly such an eloquent defense of free speech
during wartime applies with no less force today,
particularly where the current administration portends a
permanent war against terrorism. Engaging in political
speech in the streets is worthy of the most heightened
58 Masses Pub. Co., 244 F. at 540. Judge Hand further argues:

If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or
their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be
held to have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the
test, I can see no escape from the conclusion that under this
section every political agitation which can be shown to be apt
to create a seditious temper is illegal. I am confident that by
such language Congress had no such revolutionary purpose in
view [when it passed the Espionage Act].
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protection, especially because the mass media may not
accurately reflect the voices of the public, and because
much of the public lacks access to the media.5 9 Indeed, for
much of the twentieth century, the main avenues of
protest-such as leafleting, picketing, rallying on public
property, and engaging in door-to-door advocacy-were
geared toward low-cost message-making. Courts' First
60
Amendment rulings sought to protect such methods
because the rich enjoyed a built-in advantage of media
access in getting their message across to a broad audience,
and potentially were able to exclude those without such
means from public debate. 6 1 Underscoring the importance
"[F]reedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one."
Seth F. Kreimer, Social Movements and Law Reform: Technologies of
Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the FirstAmendment in the
Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 121-22 (2001) (quoting
59

A.J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (2d rev. ed. 1975)).

While media

consolidation has put the lack of access in sharp focus, see supra note
4, it can hardly be said that this concern is new. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in a 1966 trespass case, stated:
The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an
ancient history and is not limited to writing a letter or sending
a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing
before the local city council, or writing letters to the President
or Governor or Mayor. .

.

. Conventional methods of

petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large
groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal

complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic
maze; courts may let the wheels ofjustice grind very slowly.
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966) (citations omitted). In
Adderley, Florida students were convicted of "trespass with a malicious
and mischievous intent" for demonstrating against racism and other
0ovemrnmental policies on the grounds of a local jail. Id. at 40.
E.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (protecting
familiar methods is "essential to the poorly financed causes of little
VIeople").
Kreimer, supra note 59, at 122. One book reviewer refers to "a
world bought and paid for by big business, which, not coincidentally,
can count on the corporate media to push anti-people agendas."
Marlene Webber, Kicking Against Them, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 13,
2002, at D14 (book review). A letter writer contends that members of
the public will take to the streets when they are "deliberately bypassed
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of low-cost street protesting, Supreme Court Justice
Douglas noted:
Those who do not control television and
radio, those who cannot afford to advertise
in newspapers or circulate elaborate
pamphlets may have only a more limited
type of access to public officials. Their
methods should not be condemned as tactics
as the
of obstruction and harassment as long
62
assembly and petition are peaceable.
While it is true that the Internet has the potential to
provide a low-cost medium for those with dissenting
political messages to reach a broad audience, it serves more
as a highly efficient organizational, research, and
interpersonal communication tool than a replacement for
the town square. 63 Still, the Internet enables both large and
small groups, which represent the entire political spectrum,
to make their views available to readers all over the
world. 64

And thus far, they have been able to elude

governmental and media censorship in doing so. 6'

For

by those in power." Postbag, Don't be a Stooge of Globalization,
POST, Oct. 3, 2000 (letter to the editor).
BANGKOK
62
Adderley, 385 U.S. at 50-51.
63 See generally Kreimer, supra note 59, at 142-43 (arguing that the
existence of more than five billion websites creates a "digital attention
deficient" as Internet users only have so many hours in a given day to
view websites and a group's message may get lost in the clamor). See
also Frederick W. Mayer, Labor, Environment and the State of U.S.
Trade Politics, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 335, 339 (2000)
(explaining that the Internet merely allows groups to promote leaders'
efforts, solicit support, provide information to members, distribute key
documents, or serve as an informational clearinghouse, rather than
engage in the debate characteristic of visible public protests).
64 Kreimer, supra note 59, at 125. A good example of such a website
may be found at http://www.indymedia.org.
65 "Not only does the Internet allow insurgents to bypass the 'soft'
censorship of the mainstream media, but it allows evasion of the more
direct efforts at suppression of information by local, state, or national
authorities." Kreimer, supra note 59, at 127. Professor Kreimer cites

18

2:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

164

protest groups, maintaining a website means giving readers
a view of marches and police reactions that the broadcast
media may ignore. 66 Moreover, the use of Internet chat
rooms, e-mail, and websites enables dissident groups to
provide volumes of information including, for example,
complaints and court decisions that would have been
inconceivable without the computer-based medium.
Moreover, groups employ online
resources to facilitate
67
recruitment and mobilization.
Professor Seth Kreimer, however, contends that for
all its ability to move information and reach globally, the
Internet has not developed into a cyber-town square.68
Primary among the reasons for this lack of development
include what he calls the "digital attention deficit";
dissident group websites, no matter how comprehensive,
exist in a worldwide cacophony of websites, each trying to
compete for readers who only have twenty-four hours a
day. 69 Moreover, protest site publishers may be able to
post links on portals that attract heavy traffic or host more
easily found "sucks" sites.7 ° But these may not offer the
impact of ground protests at prominent venues, such as the
National Mall in Washington, which by their nature capture
the Mexican Zapatista rebels' ability to convey their accounts to the
world, Vietnamese dissenters' efforts to post banned novels, and
Serbian radio stations' web-based broadcasts to bypass airwave
jamming by the government. Id. at 127-28. Similarly, Matt Drudge's
efforts arguably dragged the mainstream media into full-scale coverage
of the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal during the Clinton era, while "the
seamy quality of the Starr Report became impossible to disguise when
the text of the report became available online." Id. at 130.
66Id. at 125-26.
67/d. at 131-37.
68 Id. at 140.
69

Id. at 142-43.

70 Kreimer, supra note 59, at 152-53.
See, e.g.,
http://homedepotsucks.com (criticizing Home Depot for trying "to
stifle [sic] freedom of speech, [and] attempting to steal this domain");
http://paypalsucks.com (critiquing the service used to pay for product
purchased on the eBay auction website). Note that businesses, aware of
the effects of "sucks" websites, have tried to thwart them through legal
means.
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7 1 "On the Internet, there are neither
the public's attention.72
malls nor sidewalks.,
While the argument is strong that the Internet has
yet to serve as a substitute for the town square, it is also
unlikely that the Internet would replicate the emotive
impact of street protest. Although his expertise lay in
copyright, Professor Melville Nimmer wrote an appellate
brief on and advocated at oral argument the value of
emotive speech in an important First Amendment case,
Cohen v. California.73 In Cohen, Justice Harlan adopted
Nimmer's own phrasing 74 when he wrote:

[W]ords are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of
individual speech, has little or no regard for
that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be
communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has said, "one of the
prerogatives of American citizenship is the
right to criticize public men and measuresand that means not only informed and
responsible criticism but the freedom 75to
speak foolishly and without moderation.,

Kreimer, supra note 59, at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
7' 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning defendant's conviction for
disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket with the slogan "Fuck the
Draft"); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1635,
1649, 1655-57 (1996).
74 Van Alstyne, supra note 73, at 1656-57.
75 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
71

72
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Because the Internet does not duplicate a true public
meeting place and the majority of the citizenry lacks
meaningful access to shape the content of the mass media,
most political dissenters still lack viable alternatives to a
public forum in which to voice their opinions.
C. The Public Forum and its Traditional
Limits
Whether bypassed by those in power, lacking
alternate vehicles for message-making, or simply outraged
at ill-conceived government policy, citizens who take to the
streets and other public spaces utilize a forum traditionally
dedicated to political expression.
Though frequently
recited in First Amendment literature, the words of Justice
Roberts, in Hague v.
Committee for Industrial
Organization,76 are worth repeating here. In that opinion,
he wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens. 7
While this proclamation of privilege should resonate like a
favorite tune to the ear of any street demonstrator, one
should note that Justice Roberts also stressed that "the
privilege of a citizen . . . to use the streets and parks for
76
77

307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Id. at 515.
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[free expression] may be regulated in the interest of all; it is

78
not absolute, but relative."
Yet, while recognizing a governmental prerogative
to regulate in the interest of peace and order, Justice
Roberts nonetheless admonished that government must not
use "the guise of regulation" to abridge or deny free

speech.79

After

deciding

Committee for Industrial

Organization,the Court developed a regulation scheme that
categorizes the use of public spaces for political expression
based on their relative availability to the public. Thus, the
Court referred to what is now known as the traditional
public forum-the streets, sidewalks, and parks found to be
"natural and proper" places for political expression. 80
These are places that "by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." 8' The
Court also has defined limited or designated public fora and
nonpublic fora, 82 but the focus of this article rests on
political expression in the traditional public forum,
Id. at 515-16. The privilege "must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace
and good order." Id.
79
Id. at 516.
80 In such places, "expressive activity will rarely be incompatible with
the intended use of the property, as is evident from the facts that they
are 'natural and proper places for dissemination of information and
opinion."' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 817 (1985) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163
t1939)).
1Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
t1983).
2 Limited or designated public fora include university meeting
facilities and municipal theaters, places that the government has
deliberately opened to expressive activity for limited time periods, for a
limited class of speakers (e.g., student groups), or for a limited range of
topics (e.g., school board business). The nonpublic forum category
refers to government property not traditionally used or deliberately
designated for speech activity. For example, courts have found post
office sidewalks, airports, state fairgrounds, jails, military bases, and a
municipally-owned pier to be nonpublic fora. For a thorough treatment
of the public forum doctrine, including abundant case citations, see
Kevin Francis O'Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45
Loy. L. REv. 411, 418-62 (1999).
78
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especially to elucidate how recent government actions have
sharply limited its availability.
The extent to which the government is permitted to
regulate speech in a public forum depends on whether or
not the content is a motivation for the constraint. Contentbased restrictions in public fora are sharply circumscribed
and strictly examined. 83
"It is axiomatic that the
government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys. ' ' 84 To be
valid, a content-based regulation "must be shown to protect
some vital state interest, or to prevent some clearly
identifiable harm. ' 85 An egregious form of content-related
regulation is that based on viewpoint. 86 "When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject, the87violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant."
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995) (citing PerryEduc. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45) (holding that a state
may regulate expressive content "only if such a restriction is necessary,
and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest").
84 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
828 (1995). Moreover, "[d]iscrimination against speech because of its
message is presumed to be unconstitutional." Id. at 828. Professor
O'Neill lists five categories in which courts have found impermissible
governmental acts that restrict speech based on content:
(1)
categorically suppressing or favoring a particular message; (2) blocking
access to a forum because of a speaker's intended message; (3)
charging higher fees for certain speakers to use a forum because the
speech is likely to generate controversy and require more police
protection; (4) withholding a subsidy to which a speaker, but for her
message, would be entitled; and (5) altering a speaker's message as the
price of access to the public forum, such as when private parade
organizers were required to include gay and lesbian participants who
would convey a message that the organizers cared not to communicate).
O'Neill, supra note 82, 429-433. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
828 (observing that the government offends the First Amendment when
it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of
their expression).
85 Mitchell, supra note 11, at * 15 (emphasis omitted).
8
6 Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829.
87 Id. "The government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction." Id. (citing Perry Educ.
83
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In contrast, where a regulation is justified without
reference to the content of the expression, courts give
government entities some leeway to constrain speech by
imposing reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
The government's purpose is the controlling
manner.
factor in determining such content neutrality. 89 When the
purpose served is unrelated to the content of the expression,
a restriction will be deemed content-neutral, even if it has
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages, but not
others. 90 The content-neutral regulation must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest-in
this context, meaning that the restriction need not represent
the least-intrusive means, but only that the governmental
interest "would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation" 9 1-and leave open ample alternate avenues
"An
through which to convey the information.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
88 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Boiled
down to its essence, the time, place, or manner doctrine permits
government to restrict speech to serve a substantial government
interest, but does not allow it to restrict more speech than necessary to
accomplish that end. Kelly Conlan, Note, The Orange Order Looks to
the FirstAmendment: Would it Protect Their Parades?,17 J.L. & POL.
553, 565 (2001).
89 Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
90 Id. at 791. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 4748 (1986)) (upholding zoning ordinance as content-neutral, even
though it affected adult theaters differently than others, because the
governmental purpose of its enactment was to quell undesirable
secondary effects attending adult theaters).
9' Id. at 797-99. "'The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations
does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible
decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting
significant government interests' or the degree to which those interests
should be promoted." Id. at 800 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). Additionally, the validity of a regulation
"depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government
seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government's
interests in an individual case." Id. at 801.
92 Ward, 491 U.S. at 801. See also Bay Area Peace Navy v. United
States, 914 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990). "[A]n alternative mode of
communication may be constitutionally inadequate if the speaker's
ability to communicate effectively is threatened.... Restrictions have
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alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to
reach the 'intended audience. ' '93 The requirement that an
alternative be ample is important because the First
Amendment "protects the right of every citizen to reach the
minds of willing listeners, and to
do so there must be
94
opportunity to win their attention."
III. Bullying with Billy Clubs: Government
Discourages Participation
Recently, governmental agencies across the nation
have undertaken extensive and expensive efforts that have
the ostensible purpose of enhancing public safety. In
reality, however, these efforts have had the effect of
curtailing the ability of political dissidents to win the
attention of their intended audience.
Much like
government officials in the late eighteenth and early
twentieth centuries, who were facing war when they passed
laws clamping down on speech, 95 federal and local leaders
today refer to concerns about terrorism as reasons for
seeking constraints on free expression. In addition to ofttimes harsh treatment of street demonstrators, 96 the
been upheld, for example, when [the challenged ordinance] does not
affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to
distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on
public property is prohibited, and the [challenged rule] has not been
shown to deny access within the forum in question." Id. at 1229
(citations, emphases, internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original); Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting ample alternatives ineffective where author of book criticizing
professional sports team owner prevented from reaching his audience
by ordinance barring him from selling the book within 1,000 feet of the
entrance to the sports venue during home games). "The alternatives
require Herculean efforts by Weinberg or his customers to complete the
sale." Id. at 1042.
93 Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94
id.
95 See discussion of Alien and Sedition Acts and Espionage Act, supra
Part
II.A.
96
See infra Part III.B.
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government has, under the auspices of the war on terror,
sought topermanently gag certain entities subject to FBI
searches.97 A New York district court judge recently found
the law prohibiting disclosure in such cases facially
unconstitutional, noting that "as our sunshine laws and
in
judicial doctrine attest, democracy abhors undue secrecy,
98
recognition that public knowledge secures freedom."
Beyond the federal government's current obsession
with secrecy is its concentrated and multi-faceted assault on
protesters and their use of public spaces to engage in
political speech. Government agencies at the federal and
local level intimidate protesters from participating,
unjustifiably denounce them as violent, impede their entry
or exit from demonstrations, assault them with chemical
agents such as pepper spray, shoot them with so-called
"less-than-lethal" projectiles (ignoring manufacturers'
suggested limitations on their use), round them up in mass
charges, and abuse them while
arrests, seek exaggerated
99
custody.
in
are
they
A. Denouncing the Participants
Before demonstrators even show up for their rally,
authorities frequently have already begun to denigrate or
intimidate them.' 00 This denunciation often takes the form
9'See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003); Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at

479-80, 483-84. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) prohibits Internet
service providers from disclosing "to any person that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or
records under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c).
98 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
99
See infra Sections III. A & III. B.
100
For example, prior to the Republican National Convention in 2004,
New York City officials demonized and criminalized those who
planned to engage in political protest and portrayed them "in the most
negative light." Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York
(S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), para. 62 [hereinafter "MacNamara Complaint"]
at
available
omitted),
marks
quotation
(internal
http://nlgnyc.org/pdf/mcclassactioncomplaint.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2005). New York Police Commissioner Kelly made public statements
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of taunts, thinly veiled threats, or apocalyptic predictions of

demonstrator-derived violence. Sometimes officials seem
to base these predictions on little more than isolated
incidences of vandalism or infrequent cases of violence that
marked previous marches in other cities.
1. Protesters' Propensity for Violence
Exaggerated

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)

"painted a dire picture" of civil disobedience and mass
protests prior to the Democratic National Convention in
August 2000,101 based on disruptions caused by dressed-inblack anarchists, who constituted a small percentage of the
tens of thousands of marchers protesting globalization at
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in
December 1999.102
During a presentation to the Los
about the threats "hard-core" and "dangerous" protesters posed to New
York City. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101 Jeffrey L. Rabin & Tina Daunt, LAPD Seeks Reversal of ProtestSite
Designation,L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at B 1.
102 The Washington Post described the scene in Seattle as follows:
Delegates who stepped out of their hotels Tuesday morning,
the first day of the [WTO] conference, with freshly issued ID
badges around their necks [exited their hotels to find that]
throngs of chanting demonstrators had taken control of the
streets of downtown Seattle. With arms linked, they formed
tight human chains to block all entrances to the convention
center where the meeting would take place.
Downtown's usual din of traffic was banished, replaced by the
beating of protesters' drums and a lone trombone's wail, by
chants and '60s rock tunes at peak volumes. Riot police
marched in tight phalanxes, slapping their nightsticks against
the sides of their boots. The sound was like massed jackboots
on pavement.
Robert G. Kaiser & John Burgess, A Seattle Primer: How Not to Hold
WTO Talks, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1999, at 40. Most protesters
left property alone, but a small group of youths dressed in black, whose
faces were covered with ski masks or bandanas, committed acts of
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Angeles City Council in June 2000, the LAPD stirred fear
of pandemonium by showing a dramatic video of the
demonstrations in Seattle;' 0 3 the tenor of this video could
be compared to that of the famous 1936 anti-marijuana
propaganda film, "Reefer Madness."' 1 4 One police official
told the city council, "We fully expect to be fully involved
with mass arrests and civil disobedience ... 0 5 on a level of

what we saw in Seattle if not more intense."
Poking fun at the City Council's concerns over
protesters, a newspaper columnist wrote that city leaders,
looking over their shoulders at Seattle, were "shaking with
fear" over the prospect of the public relations fiasco that
street-level political expression could bring. 10 6 "With
trembling hands, they're ripping up the Constitution and
throwing it to the winds, a craven sacrifice to the gods of
chaos."' 0 7
vandalism, breaking storefront windows of businesses such as
McDonalds and Starbucks and spray-painting slogans on buildings. Id.
"Though more than 20,000 union members marched peacefully in
Seattle that day, the world would see and remember the sporadic
violence and the clouds of tear gas." Id. The mayor of Seattle
responded to these impromptu protests (other, sanctioned events took
place at the same time in other parts of the city) by calling out the
National Guard, covering every street comer of downtown Seattle with
baton-wielding police officers "in head-to-toe black" who marched
shoulder-to-shoulder and shoved demonstrators out of a 25-block zone
of the city in which free speech effectively had been banned. Mitchell,
supra note 11, at *33, *35; Lynda Gorov, A Crackdown Calms Seattle
Action Taken to Prevent Confrontation, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1999,
at
10 3Al.
id.
The author of this article, who was a newspaper reporter at the time,
104
attended the City Council meeting at which the LAPD showed its fearof-another-Seattle video, and saw the video. For further information on
Reefer Madness, see http://www.reefer-madness-movie.com (last
visited August 22, 2005).
105 Chris Ford, Police Outline Plan To Handle Protests, L.A. DAILY J.,
June 29, 2000, at 2.
106Garry Abrams, Spines in Short Supply, Wimp City Faces Dreadful
ElectoralPestilence, L.A. DAILY J., July 11, 2000, at 1.
107 Id. The LAPD even went so far as to chop down trees for fear that
protesters might set them afire and to remove newspaper racks from
downtown Los Angeles in case they might be used as battering rams.
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2. Protesters Depicted as
"Terrorists"
Preparing to host the 2004 Republican National
Convention, New York City officials, no doubt still
haunted by images of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on their city, were concerned about a repeat during
the GOP political event. However, their concerns about
terrorist threats morphed into a practice of lumping
demonstrators and terrorists together. 10 8 The media gave a
voice to this effort. A top police official, for example, cited
"terrorist threats and the escalating plans of anarchist
groups to disrupt the city of New York" as cause for
concern.l°9 A civil rights attorney told Newsday, "The
context we're now operating here in New York City is that
protesters are terrorist threats, protesters are anarchists,
protesters are the enemy."110 Furthermore, New York
Mayor Michael Bloomberg presumed demonstrators had
criminal motives by making statements to the press that
they "came here to get arrested." 11 Likewise, John Street,
Todd S. Purdum, The 2000 Campaign: The Scene; Police and
ProtestersReady; PoliticiansHope for the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,

2000, at 22.
108 E.g., Bryan Virasami, GOP Convention Threats; Arrests led to
fingerprints; Top police official says terrorfears convinced cops to
verify IDs of hundreds held that week, NEWSDAY, Oct. 27, 2004, at
A05.
109 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Newsday also reported that

police fingerprinted hundreds of protesters during the Republican
National Convention "due to looming threats by terrorist and anarchist
groups." Id.
o Id.

111 "The mayor... urged demonstrators not to fight their cases in court,
despite the fact that many say they haven't done anything wrong - and
out-of-towners who have pleaded guilty said they did so to avoid
returning to New York." Glenn Thrush, Convention Arrests; Mayor to
ex- detainees: Plead Guilty, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 2004, at A15. "The

mayor's comment reflects a disdain for the principle that people are
innocent until proven guilty."
Id. (quoting Donna Lieberman,
Executive Director for the New York Civil Liberties Union). Mayor
Bloomberg further made public statements that those engaging in free
speech were "terrorists and guilty criminals." MacNamara Complaint
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the mayor of Philadelphia anticipated the arrival of
demonstrators to the 2000 Republican National Convention
by belittling them, calling them "idiots."" 2 He then issued
a warning, stating "[s]ome will come here to disrupt, to
make a spectacle of what's going on. They are going to get
a very ugly response."' 1 3 While mayors of Philadelphia
and New York made no effort to hide their hostility toward
free expression, recently a spokesman for the anti-terrorism
section of the California Department of Justice was even
more blatant, desigating anti-war protesting as a form of
terrorism outright.
Similarly, police training in preparation for antiglobalization demonstrations that coincided with a 2003
Miami meeting of Western leaders attempting to create a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) emphasized
violent protests, yet gave little regard to protection of free
speech. 15 The media build-up of the Miami FTAA
anarchists,
"anarchists,
the
emphasized
protests
6
anarchists." 11 The emphasis on anarchists "contributed to
a police mindset to err, when in doubt, on the side of
fara. 62.
"[W]e have got some idiots coming here. Some will come and say
whatever obnoxious things they want to say and go home."
supra note 1, at 21.
BOGHOSIAN,
13
Id.

Mike van Winkle, the spokesman for the California Anti-Terrorism
Information Center told the Oakland Tribune, "You can make an easy
kind of a link that, if you have a protest group protesting a war where
the cause that's being fought against is international terrorism, you
might have terrorism at that protest. You can almost argue that a
protest against that is a terrorist act." James Bovard, Quarantining
Dissent: How the Secret Service protects Bush from free speech, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 4, 2003, at D1.
115 "[Miami-Dade Police Department] spent 40,000 'work hours'
preparing for this event, yet the training materials in the After-Action
Report document little pertaining to the protection of citizen rights of
free expression." Independent Review Panel of the Miami-Dade
Police Department, The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
at
available
2004,
20,
Sept.
5,
Report
Inquiry
http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
116Id. at 6.
114
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dramatic show of force." ' 1 7 Disconcertingly, this mindset
inhibited police from performing such basic tasks as
assisting members of the public." 8 In Seattle after the 1999
WTO Conference, the city council ultimately concluded
that the images of rampant violence and chaos, which the
media repetitiously broadcast to the world, amounted to an
inaccurate portrayal, "as peaceful political demonstrators
'were drowned out by press coverage of disturbances."'11 9
Politicians, police, and the media are not the only
ones who are quick to characterize citizens who go to
public places and engage in political speech as hoodlums
prone to violence. Sadly, this mindset crept into a federal
court considering a motion by protest groups to enjoin the
city of Boston, host of the 2004 Democratic National
Convention, from forcing demonstrators to protest in a
zone so harsh that the court said created the "overall
impression... of an internment camp."' 120 Despite finding
the protest zone to be "a grim, mean, and oppressive
place," the court justified the city of Boston's security
measures in light of the surmised potential
for protesters to
12 1
combat."'
"hand-to-hand
in
engage police

117 The idea was "to preempt violence rather than being subject to
criticism for avoidable injury and destruction based on a reserved
Id.
firesence of police force."
The report cites "failure by the police to respond appropriately to
civilian inquiries for directions, street closings, and other assistance."
Id. Suspicion of protesters is not new in Florida; St. Petersburg police
practices of photographing demonstrators and recording their license
plate numbers while they marched were criticized in 1988 for their
chilling effect on free speech and assembly. Such tactics are similar to
those the FBI allegedly used starting in 1981 in surveillance of groups
opposed to U.S. foreign policy in Central America. See Stephen Koff,

City Police Accused of Spying at Rallies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.

14, 1988, at 1.
119 Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1160 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005)

(Paez, J., dissenting).
120 Coalition to Protest DNC v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74
(D. Mass. 2004).
121Id. at 67, 75.
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B. Penalizing the Participants
The government further chills expression and limits
access to the public forum through intimidating and violent
treatment of protesters, denial of access to public spaces,
limiting ingress to and egress from marches, mass arrests
that sometimes include uninvolved bystanders, and abusive
122
treatment during detention.
1. Show of Force Intimidation
Police agencies prepare for demonstrations almost
as though they are headed to war with a violent enemy
rather than ensuring safety in a public forum for First
Amendment expression. 123 For example, Los Angeles
police projected their rough-and-ready image prior to the
2000 Democratic National Convention by staging a training
for television cameras to film a mock containment of
protesters.124 Protest planners became so frustrated by preconvention harassment by police that they sued the city of
Los Angeles to get it to stop taking actions "aimed at
chilling [their] speech."' 12 5 The police officers questioned
the protestors about their identification, told them walking
the streets without identification was illegal, buzzed their
planning center with low-flying helicopters, and taunted

122

National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01-6877

FMV (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2003), available at http://www.nlgla.org/NLG v.-City.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
123 Chris Ford, Commission Praises LAPD for Handling of Protest
Marches, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 23, 2000, at 1.
124Nicholas Riccardi & Jeffrey L. Rabin, ProtestersSay L.A. Will Be
Used as a Model of Injustice, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at B1.
125 D2K Convention Planning Coalition v. Parks, CV-00-08556 (C.D.
Cal., filed Aug. 8). See also Chris Ford, Lawyers Will Be Keeping a
Close Eye on the LAPD, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 11, 2000, at 1. ("The
complaint accuses the LAPD of carrying out an 'intense, wellorchestrated campaign of intimidation and harassment' and seeks a
temporary injunction against the police actions.").
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them with threats of planning center raids.' 26 During the
convention, police, with their uniforms bristling with
pepper-spray canisters, tear-gas guns, and other weaponry,
menaced would-be protesters.127
The city sent
overwhelming numbers of heavily armed officers even to
small gatherings.1 28
One Los Angeles City Council
member noted, "There were demonstrations I29was at where
there were more police than demonstrators." 1
Police frequently project a menacing presence at
demonstrations by showing up in heavy riot gear, which
critics deride as "Darth Vader" uniforms. 1 3
After
examining how police handled the demonstrations during
the FTAA meeting, a Miami police review board conceded
that "[t]he overwhelming riot-clad police presence, when
there was no civil disturbance, chilled some citizen
participation in permitted and lawful demonstrations and
126 id.
127

Ford, supra note 123.

128id.
129 Chris Ford, Council Rails at Heavy DNC Police Presence, L.A.
DAILY J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another City Council member emphasized the heavy cost the city of
Los Angeles bore to police the convention, calling it a "fraud on the
taxpayers from the moment it started." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). City officials had estimated that the policing tab would be
$8.3 million, but it reached nearly $36 million, with almost $10 million
going just toward overtime pay for police officers. Id. The difference
between the estimated and ultimate policing cost was "more than [Los
Angeles] spends to fix sidewalks in the city, trim trees in the city and
clean up every neighborhood in the city." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The police presence during convention week was compared
to that of an occupying army and criticized as "staggering,
inappropriate and over the edge."
1d. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
130 "Having witnessed the .. . outrageous overreaction to the minor
protests of the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, I now know what it
feels like to live in a police state. The horde of officers in their Darth
Vader costumes dominated the streets, dwarfing and menacing the few
hundred peaceful protesters."
John Schauer, Letter to the Editor,
Failure of Pot Initiatives a Victory Anarchy vs. Liberty Protesting
Overkill Silencing Free Speech Not-so-Sweet Deal Who's Typical?
Curing What Ails Docs Throw the Bums Out Tax the Aldermen, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, at 34.
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events." 13 1 At one point, Miami police in riot gear blocked
even though there was no
access to a church service,
132
time.
the
at
demonstration
The intimidation of protesters is not always pressed
at the tip of a billy club. In 2002, the Justice Department
lifted FBI restrictions imposed in 1976 and began allowing
lives.
this federal agency to spy on Americans' everyday
The FBI encouraged its agents to enhance "paranoia" by
increasing the number of interviews it conducted with antiwar activists.1 34 The FBI claimed that doing so would "get
the point across that there is an FBI agent behind every
mailbox." 135
2. Use of Force Causes Injuries
While the so-called Miami Model came under some
criticism from the police review panel, the panel's report
does not tell the full story. According to those present,
Miami police employed extraction teams, described as
squads of plain-clothes officers in full body armor,
"wearing ski masks.., jumping out of vans and dragging
Other snatch squads would drag
protesters off.' 136
protesters behind three-row police lines, preventing legal
observers and medics from identifying the detainees and
gaining access to them. 137 Moreover, legal observers in
Miami obtained arrest reports listing "brutality, beatings
and such-tasers, wooden and rubber bullets, many cops
131

Id.

132/id.

supra note 114.
Id. (quoting from an internal FBI newsletter) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 Christopher
Getzan, Infamous 'Miami Model' of Protest
Clampdown, Coming to a Town Near You, THE NEW STANDARD, June
at
available
2004,
8,
4 88
http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action-show-item&itemid=
(last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 53.
133 Bovard,
134
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beating
one person, concussion grenades, electrical shields,
13
etc."

In Los Angeles, the police department's policymaking board questioned officers' use of "less-lethal"
weapons at a demonstration protesting police brutality in
October 2000.139 There, police shot demonstrators with
weapons designed, according to their manufacturer, for use
against "subjects heavily dressed and in a violent
mindset." 14 0 Among the weapons used that day was one
intended for use against armed or violent individuals,
which was described as "an excellent tool" for cell
extractions or cellblock-clearing operations in prisons. 141
Police in Portland, Oregon used not only less-thanlethal weapons during a protest coinciding with a 2002
political fundraiser for President Bush but also used pepper
spray. 142 Police claimed that protesters were interfering
with the ability of attendees to reach the event site and
ordered the crowd to move back 120 feet. 143 After
demonstrators allegedly ignored the order, officers
assaulted the crowd with pepper spray and shot crowd
members with rubber bullets. 14 In the resulting civil rights
lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that officers sprayed peaceful
Id. at 54.
139Chris Ford, Panel Checks 'Less-Lethal' Weapons, L.A. DAILY J.,
138

Dec. 20, 2000, at 1. (on file with author).
140 Id. at 9. (internal quotation marks omitted). It should be noted that
while the weapons are designed for use against "heavily dressed"

subjects, in October the sun in Los Angeles typically generates
summer-like temperatures. In fact, the average high temperature in Los
Angeles in October is 78 degrees and rarely is it necessary to be heavily
dressed. See National Weather Service, Downtown Los Angeles
Climate Page,
1921-2004
Data, Observed
and
Average
Monthly/Annual,
Max
Temp,
http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/lox/climate/cvc.php (last visited Feb. 13,
2005).
141 Ford, supra note 139, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV-02-1448-HA, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25685 at *2 (D. Ore. Sept. 8, 2003).
14 Id. at *2-*3.
144id.
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protesters in the face with pepper spray and other chemical

agents. 145 Police forcefully blocked the exit of one family
with small children, including an 11-month-old who had
been pepper sprayed, even though they were screaming in
pain and seeking medical attention.1 46 Police sprayed the
parents and their three children without warning.
Second Amended Complaint, Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV02-1448-HA, at paras. 5.6, 5.8-5.11 (D. Ore. Sept. 8, 2003).
146 Id. In one incident, officers, without audible warning, "doused and
soaked" protesters with pepper spray, aiming the weapons directly into
the faces of the protesters, and caused one protestor to sustain extreme
pain and chemical burns. Id. paras. 4.5-4.6. In another incident, the
family with children ages 6, 3, and 11 months, who were concerned
that they had been surrounded by officers as the demonstration wound
down, sought to exit the protest area but were twice denied by police.
Id. paras. 6.4-6.6. Later, an officer "took aim" at the mother and
sprayed chemical agents into her face, also hitting her 11-month-old
child. Id. para. 6.8. The father was sprayed in the eyes, so both parents
were debilitated and kneeling or prone on the ground in pain. Id. paras.
6.7, 6.9. Meanwhile, their three children were crying in pain and fear
and left "unattended by their parents for a period due to the effects of
the chemical agents and their parents' incapacitation from the chemical
agents." Id. para. 6.9. The complaint further alleges that the Portland
police officers' assault on the demonstrators violated the First
Amendment because "[t]he mass spraying of chemical agents caused a
large number of peaceful protesters to leave the area and abandon their
lawful free speech and assembly activities." Id. at para. 5.11.
145

147

Ryan Frank, et al., Cleanup, Questions Begin, THE OREGONIAN,

Aug. 23, 2002, at A01. "There was no warning, no ultimatum,
nothing," the father told a newspaper reporter as he tried to comfort his
wailing 11-month-old son, whose eyes were red and swollen. "They
picked the guy with three kids to spray first." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In a more recent and similar episode in Pittsburgh,
police used Tasers, pepper spray, batons, and dogs against people
demonstrating in front of a military recruitment station. Pittsburg
Organizing Group, Press Release, Save Our Civil Liberties, Pittsburgh
Police Attack Non-Violent Protestors With Tasers, Pepper Spray and
at
available
Units,
K-9
(last
http:///www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/2005/08/1180.shtml
Two of the demonstrators required
visited Jan. 30, 2006).
hospitalization. Id. One of those hospitalized was a grandmother who
was bitten from behind by a police dog, arrested, and kept in an
unventilated police van in the hot sun for 45 minutes. The other person
hospitalized was a young woman who police officers pepper sprayed
directly in the face and then "Taser[ed] her mercilessly as she lay on
the street screaming." Id. Police also pepper-sprayed a four-year-old
girl and toppled a man with multiple sclerosis in his motorized
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Checkpoints and Denial of Access
to Public Fora

During some events which drew strong opposition
from protesters, police erected barriers or thwarted public
passage to spaces that clearly are public fora. For example,
armed officers staffed checkpoints outside the FTAA
meeting site in Miami, and several streets were off limits to
anyone without meeting credentials. 148
One reporter
observed, "Security fences cut up downtown
like a jigsaw
149
checkpoints.'
numerous
puzzle, with
Police in Los Angeles during the 2000 Democratic
National Convention protests, as well as at another
demonstration later that year, used a slightly different
tactic, blocking ingress to and egress from ongoing
demonstrations in public places. 150 A district court found
credible evidence that Los Angeles police "prevented
people from joining [a] demonstration, standing on the
sidewalk, or leaving the march for any reason, including to
use the restroom or disperse [sic] leaflets."151 The court
found that those actions permitted a reasonable inference
that police unconstitutionally chilled the demonstrators'
wheelchair.
Id.
48

1 BOGHOSIAN,
149 Id. (quoting

supra note 1, at 44.
John Pacenti, Miami Trade Summit Security Hailed,

Reviled, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at Al).

150 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, No. CV-01-6877 FMV (order granting in part
and denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment). New
York police also have limited ingress to and egress from ongoing
demonstrations. See Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *14-*15 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
151 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, No. CV-01-6877 FMV, at 10 (granting in part
and denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment).
Plaintiffs, a coalition of protest groups and a human rights bar
association, alleged that along with blocking ingress to and egress from
demonstrations in August and October 2000, police improperly
terminated legal political protests "without cause," used excessive force
against those engaged in free expression, and drowned out participants'
speech by flying helicopters at low altitudes "without a legitimate law
enforcement justification to do so." Id. at 5.
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4. Mass Arrests, Exaggerated
Charges
During events that attract large numbers of
protesters, police have engaged in mass arrests or roundups and file exaggerated charges--or even charges for
crimes that do not exist-against those arrested. For
example, during the 2004 Republican National Convention,
New York police arrested more than 1,800, suddenly
sweeping protesters, legal observers, members of the
media, and even bystanders from the street in orange plastic
nets. 153
Id. at 9. A New York court related the account of a family whose
participation at a 2003 anti-war demonstration was effectively
thwarted, and thus their expression chilled, by the New York City
police department's use of barricades and protest pens. Trapped blocks
from the event, the family decided to go home because the mother did
not believe that "there was going to be any way ever of getting
anywhere close to the demonstration." Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13350, at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 Dan Janison, et al., There was order, but at what price?, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 4, 2004, at A04; Diane Cardwell, Lawyers' Group Sues City Over
Arrests of Protestors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B3. See also
MacNamara Complaint, paras. 87A., 87B (noting police used "orange
nets[] to arrest groups of people lawfully standing on sidewalks in
Times Square, including legal observers and members of the media").
Id. paras. 87B (stating police used the orange nets to round up and
arrest "individuals who were either participating in, observing, or were
merely in the vicinity of a march which began in Union Square"). Id.
paras. 87D, 142 (pointing out that one march had not even proceeded a
full block when police officers surrounded more than 200 people, used
the orange nets, and arrested them all, even though they had remained
on the sidewalk without blocking it and had complied with police
instructions). Id. para. 161 (explaining that a group was assembling for
a permitted march when a police officer screamed and officers rounded
up the participants with plastic orange netting and handcuffed them).
Id. para. 185 (noting that officers surrounded a group of demonstrators
after an officer shouted, "Arrest them all!" The group included
protesters "as well as non-protesting bystanders") (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also First Amended Complaint Schiller v. New
York, No. 04 Civ. 07922, para. 24 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), available at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/mc-lawsuit-schiller.pdf ("At Convention-related
152
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In addition, while posting smaller numbers of
arrestees, during the 2000 Democratic National
Convention, the Los Angeles police carried out mass
arrests, forcing detainees to wait hours to be processed,
strip searching some of the detainees, and filing charges
that either were thrown out for lack of probable cause or
were based on nonexistent law.154
An attorney
representing a group of animal rights activists, who were
arrested en masse during the Los Angeles Convention,
characterized the round-up as "an unlawful effort to
suppress expressions of dissent.'' 155 The forty-two animal
rights activists were arrested after they marched into a
demonstrations there were nearly 1,800 arrests, many of them mass
arrests of people lawfully on public sidewalks or streets, with lawabiding demonstrators and innocent bystanders alike being swept up.").
Another New York case arising from the 2004 Republican National
Convention contains this account of a violent mass arrest:
[A] group of demonstrators carrying signs and playing drums
and other instruments left its gathering place at the southem
end of Union Square Park and proceeded north on Union
Square East. They were followed by curious observers. After
the police prevented the demonstrators and observers from
proceeding north on Union Square East, the group moved east
on 16th Street. Using mesh nets and large numbers of officers,
the police then sealed off both ends of the block . . . and
refused to allow anyone inside to leave. Many of those trapped
between the police lines had been walking lawfully on the
sidewalk, and some had not even been following the
demonstrators but were simply caught in the crowd when the
police sealed the entire block. Without giving any opportunity
for people to disperse, the police began systematically
arresting people on the block, throwing some people to the
ground.
First Amended Complaint, Dinler v. New York, No. 04 Civ. 07921
para.
3
(S.D.N.Y.
filed
2004),
available
at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/rnc_lawsuitdinler.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
154 See infra notes 155-61, 165-70 and accompanying text.
155 "It's very obvious what was going on here," the attorney
added.
"They arrested these kids on Tuesday [the second of the four days the
convention lasted] and they planned to hold them until Friday after the
convention." David Houston, Animal Rights Activists Plan to Sue City,
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 22, 2000, at 2.
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commercial area of downtown Los Angeles and
approached a jewelry store they mistook for a furrier while
chanting that it is harmful to wear animal fur. 156 The store
owner became frantic and closed the metal security grate,
prompting some to kick or bang on the grate. 157 Police
rounded up these protesters, sixteen of whom were
juveniles, forced them against a wall with their hands up,
forced them to sit in the hot sun and in a police bus for
hours, and charged them with conspiracy to commit
vandalism. 158 A judge threw out the charges for all but two
of the protestors for lack of probable cause. 159 In another
incident shortly before the beginning of the 2000 DNC
Convention, Los Angeles police arrested two young women
who had been participating in the protest planning,
into
handcuffed them, interrogated them, and threw them
16 1
holding cells. 160 Their alleged crime: jaywalking.
While police lacked probable cause to arrest the
animal rights demonstrators, they charged a group of
156 Ted Rohrlich & Henry Weinstein, Convention-Related Arrests
Cause Little Stir in Legal System, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2000, at A22.
157 Id. Anne La Jeunesse, DNC Anti-Fur Activist Pleads No Contest,
L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 16, 2000, at 2.
158 Houston, supra note 155; Anne La Jeunesse, Observers See Protest
Photos Taken by Police, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 18, 2000, at 11 (stating
that an ACLU attorney pointed out that police arrested legal observers
and journalists along with the protesters, contending that the police
were engaged in "a pattern to try to eliminate observers of their...
misconduct"); Susan McRae, Volunteer Cameraman Sees the Rougher
Side, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 18, 2000, at 1. A student filming the animal
rights protest and subsequent arrest was clubbed by a police officer in
full riot gear and not informed of the charges against him. Id. at 11;
Rohrlich & Weinstein, supra note 156.
159 Anne La Jeunesse, Court Drops Charges in Ant-Fur Protest Case,
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 26, 2000, at 2. Two others, who allegedly kicked
the store-front grate, were charged with felony vandalism, and one of
these later pleaded guilty to the charge. Id.
160 Ford, supra note 123.
161 Id. An ACLU lawyer commented, "Obviously, it's unheard of for
somebody to be hauled off to [the police station] and handcuffed... for
jaywalking. This sort of repression of people for their political views is
to be expected in a police state, but it has no place in a democratic
country." Ford, supra note 125, at 1.
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bicyclists with reckless driving, a violation that does not
apply to bike riders under California law. 162 Advocating
the increased use of bicycles instead of cars, seventy one
bicyclists were riding through downtown Los Angeles as
part of a sanctioned demonstration, when they suddenly
were swarmed by motorcycle officers, who shouted, "Put
your bikes down!"' 163 The bicyclists were subjected to
mass arrest; 164 yet unsurprisingly, all charges were later
dropped. 165 Additionally, bicyclists in a similar
event in
66
New York in 2004 endured the same treatment.'
5. Abuses in Detention
The twenty three women among the bicyclists in
Los Angeles were strip-searched twice-once after a judge
had already ordered their release.' 67 Los Angeles County
Flynn McRoberts, Dear Mother Tribune, Send Bail Money, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 17, 2000, at 17. Realizing that police had wrongly charged
the bicyclists, the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office revised the
charges to misdemeanor obstructing a public way and two traffic
infractions. Id.
163 id.
164 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
McRoberts, a Chicago
Tribune reporter who bicycled with the group known as Critical Mass
to report on the event, further described the process: "With their hands
on their holstered batons, officers in riot gear told us to get 'up against
the fence!'" Id. Most officers acted professionally, but they "cuffed us
behind our backs with hard plastic 'flex cuffs' and kept us at the fence
under [an] overpass for an hour or so," and made the group wait in a
bus for another hour. Id. "Out of the blue, they cornered the riders and
ordered them off their bikes.... There was no warning, no message to
disperse. It was very scary. I mean, we just went on a bike ride. How
did we end up in jail?" Sue Fox, $2.75 Million Proposedfor Cyclists
Arrested in Protest, L.A. TIMES, March 25, 2003, at BI (internal
luotation marks omitted).
Fox, supra note 164, at B 1.
166 During the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York,
once-cooperative police officers turned on participants in the bicycling
event. Police "used orange nets to trap and arrest scores of people
participating in [the] bicycle event that [police] had allowed to take
place for nearly one and one-half hours before the mass arrests were
made without warning." MacNamara Complaint, para. 87A.
167 Fox, supra note 164. Also, after the judge ordered their release, the
162
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sheriff's deputies walked the women, many in biking shorts
and tank tops, past holding cells filled with jeering male
They were taken to a chilly cinder-block
prisoners. 16
hallway and ordered to face the wall and undress,
whereupon "belligerent uniformed officers" conducted
visual body cavity searches of the women.'69 Los Angelesarea taxpayers shelled out $3.625 million to settle lawsuits
that arose from this treatment. 170 In 2003, FTAA protesters
were also strip-searched.17 1 They accused Miami jailers of
violating their Fourth Amendment rights by requiring them
to undergo strip and visual body cavity searches without
reasonable suspicion that such searches would disclose
contraband or weapons.172
Aside from strip searches, denial of access to
medicine and phone calls,173 and being held beyond their
release date, members of the public who have participated
in political speech have experienced other abuses in
detention. They have been denied access to restroom
facilities and forced to endure lengthy detention in cold,
women participants were denied telephone calls and access to
medication. Id. Even the judge himself could not resist over-restricting
protesters by requiring as a condition of their bail that they refrain from
riding bicycles, prompting criticism from a criminal lawyer. Rohrlich
& Weinstein, supra note 156. "Ordering someone not to ride a bicycle
has nothing to do with guaranteeing the person will appear in court,"
the lawyer said. Id. The lawyer further questioned the constitutionality
of the judge's order that a bicycle messenger not ride his bike, because

he is being deprived of his livelihood. Id.
168 Rohrlich & Weinstein, supra note 156.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Elizabeth Fernandez, Stripsearch claims spur immediate outcry; Women's lawsuits inspire calls
for reform, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2003, at A13.
170 The women received $70,000 apiece and the men $5,000 each in the
$2.75 million settlement with Los Angeles County. Fernandez, supra
note 169, at A13; Fox, supra note 161, at Bl. In addition, the City of
Los Angeles paid $875,000 to settle a lawsuit from the same group of
bicyclists based on lack of probable cause for their arrest. Council OKs
Settlement Over Convention Protest,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B3.
171 Haney v. Miami-Dade County, No. 04-20516-CIV, 2004 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 19552, *4-*6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2004).
169

172
173

id.
E.g., MacNamara Complaint.
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toxin-suffused quarters. 174 Protesters and others who were
corralled in orange nets and arrested in New York during
the 2004 Republican National Convention were hauled to
Pier 57, a filthy bus storage and repair facility, where they
allegedly were exposed to a variety of toxic and
carcinogenic chemicals and substances for up to 50
hours. 175 Environmental inspections of this facility in 2001
and early 2004 revealed a lack of fire protection systems,
asbestos particles, and "floors covered with black oily
soot." 176

The New York arrestees, furthermore, were caged
in chain-link fence enclosures topped with razor wire that
did not have enough benches for sitting or sleeping,
requiring detainees to rest on the grime- and chemical1 77
covered floor, which caused skin rashes and blisters.
The facilities not only lacked adequate restroom facilities,
78
but also lacked toilet paper and a place to wash up.'
During the arrest process, demonstrators and bystanders
were handcuffed for hours, causing pain, numbness, and
swelling, as well as denied access to restroom facilities and
medical attention. 179 Some plaintiffs contended that the
174 See supra, Part III.B.4.; Gorov, supra note 102 (Seattle police

arrested hundreds, holding them "face-down on the wet streets, their
hands bound with plastic handcuffs"). All arrestees were fingerprinted,
even if accused of only "minor offenses for which fingerprinting is
unnecessary." Id. at para 64.
175MacNamara Complaint, paras. 66, 78, 90, 95, 110, 126, 176, 193.
'

76

Id. at para. 67.

Moreover, although detainees were dressed for hot summer weather,
the facilities were kept cold with fans blowing at top speed, and they
were not given blankets or other means to keep warm. Id. at paras. 67,
77, 78, 93.
178 Id. at para. 93.
179 Id. at paras. 92, 93 (plaintiff complained of handcuff tightness, but
officer said nothing could be done; she suffered three weeks of
numbness, pain and swelling of her left hand); Id. at paras. 95, 96, 97,
98 (plaintiff a Ph.D. and vice-president at J.P. Morgan, was arrested
while merely walking home from a bookstore and despite lack of
probable cause for her arrest; officer told her, "Sorry but you were at
the wrong place at the wrong time"; she suffered extreme pain in her
shoulder and swelling in her hand due to the handcuffing); MacNamara
177
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City of New York deliberately and needlessly detained
protesters and others for lengthy periods even when they
could have processed them more80 quickly using existing
booking facilities around the city. 1
IV. Intent to Silence Implied: How Governmental
Actions Chill Free Expression
The plaintiffs further asserted that the mass roundups, arrests allegedly without probable cause, and
unnecessarily long detentions in cruel and inhumane
conditions were intended "to punish and retaliate against
'
individuals who were engaging in political protest." '8
city deterred the expression of core
Consequently, the
182
speech.
political
It is true that city officials at least need to be
prepared to maintain order in case crowds-or even a small
Complaint paras. 102, 107-08, 112-14, 118-19, 123-24, 133-34, 13738, 143-44, 146, 151-52, 173-74, 177-78, 182, 186, 191, 195 (noting
that extremely tight handcuffing for many hours caused plaintiffs
extreme pain, discomfort, and numbness); Cardwell, supra note 152, at
B3. ("marchers suddenly swept into orange nets, languishing on buses
in tight handcuffs without medical attention, and one woman, panicked,
in convulsions after being corralled into a mass arrest as she walked to
work"). See also First Amended Complaint, Dinler v. New York, No.
04 Civ. 07921, para. 3 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), available at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/mcjlawsuit-dinler.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006);
First Amended Complaint, Schiller v. NewYork, No. 04 Civ 07922,
at
available
2004),
filed
24
(S.D.N.Y.
para.
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/mcjlawsuit-schiller.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2006).
180 Some of the plaintiffs further pointed out that in 1982 the city
processed 1,600 demonstrators and usually released them the same day,
often within several hours. MacNamara Complaint, at paras. 63, 65.
Protesters argued that the city held arrestees too long to avoid
embarrassing city leaders during the convention. Sabrina Tavemise,
City to Pay $150 a Person in G.O.P. Arrest Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
April 16, 2005, at B3. The city settled one dispute over arrest and
detainment methods for $231,200, and the city's comptroller office
stated that 570 notices of claim totaling $859 million had been filed.
Id.
181 Id. at para 61.
182 id.
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percentage of a crowd-should decide to abandon the
peaceful methods that most tend to follow. The vast
majority of protesters at the Seattle WTO demonstration in
1999 were peaceful, but a small contingent appeared
willing to engage in property destruction. 183 In New York
in 2004, city leaders were attempting to ensure that the
streets remained safe for city residents and visiting
politicians alike, a concern overlain by the specter of a
reprisal of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the
city. 184 But while a government justifiably concerns itself
with public safety, it may not limit speech based on mere
conjecture that vandalism (which courts, elected officials
and the media frequently characterize as "violence") or
disruption might occur. 185
It follows that "First
Amendment jurisprudence teaches that banning speech is
an unacceptable means of planning for potential
misconduct."' 86 Moreover, "[t]he courts have held that the
183Kaiser

& Burgess, supra note 102.

184 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
185According

to the Ninth Circuit,

Although the government legitimately asserts that it need not
show an actual terrorist attack or serious accident to meet its
burden, it is not free to foreclose expressive activity in public
areas on mere speculation about danger. Otherwise, the
government's restriction of first amendment expression in
public areas would become essentially unreviewable.
Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1228 (citations and internal
%uotation marks omitted).
6 Serv. Employee Int'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d
966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d. 1363,
1373 (9th Cir. 1997)).
The law is clear that First Amendment activity may not be
banned simply because prior similar activity led to or involved
instances of violence. There are sound reasons for this rule.
Demonstrations can be expected when the government acts in
highly controversial ways, or other events occur that excite or
arouse the passions of the citizenry. The more controversial
the occurrence, the more likely people are to demonstrate.
Some of these demonstrations may become violent. The

45

2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 191

proper response to potential and actual violence is for the
government to ensure an adequate police presence and to
arrest those who actually engage in such conduct, rather
First Amendment conduct as a
than to suppress legitimate
'1 87
measure."
prophylactic
Therefore, the aggressive tactics undertaken by
police, as well as governmental acts blocking access to the
public forum, arguably violate this principle, because they
curtail free expression based on the possibility that mischief
may erupt rather than based on actual wrongdoing by those
Furthermore, the
engaged in political speech.
government's ignoble and rough treatment of dissidents
violates the First Amendment by discouraging
participation.
A. "Ordinary Firmness" Standard
To successfully allege a First Amendment violation
under such circumstances, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's actions deterred or chilled the plaintiff's speech
and that the deterrence was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendant's conduct. 188 While this statement
"might be read to suggest that a plaintiff must demonstrate
that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed [the
court] requires only a demonstration that defendants
intended to interfere with [plaintiffs'] First Amendment
rights."' 189 A court, thus, will examine "whether an
courts have held that the proper response to potential and
actual violence is for the government to ensure an adequate
police presence and to arrest those who actually engage in
such conduct, rather than to suppress legitimate First
Amendment conduct as a prophylactic measure.
Collins, 110 F.3d at 1372 (citations omitted).
187 Collins, 110 F.3d at 1372.
188 Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d
1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).
189 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court looks to intent
"[b]ecause it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability
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official's acts would chill or silence a person of' 9ordinary
0

firmness from future First Amendment activities."'
The intent component of this principle was at issue
in Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino
County. 19 1 There, a bomb went off under the car of an
environmental activist while she was driving it, severely
injuring her. 192
Police and FBI agents ascribed
responsibility for the explosion to the activist, then her
passenger and released incriminating information about
them that later proved to be false; charges against the
activists were never filed. 193 The activist and her passenger
sued, alleging inter alia that the police and FBI agents
conspired to falsely accuse them in connection with the
bombing, chilling their First Amendment activities. 194 The
court found intent on the part of the police and FBI because
their actions included describing the environmental
1 95
activists as "members of a violent terrorist group,"'
for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually
determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity." Id.
190 Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir.
1996), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1273 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord, Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252 (5th
Cir. 2002). It is settled law among federal appellate courts that

to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against an
ordinary citizen, [plaintiffs] must show that (1) they were
engaged

in constitutionally

protected activity,

(2)

the

defendants' actions caused them to suffer an injury that would

chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage

in that activity, and (3) the defendants' adverse actions were
substantially motivated against the plaintiffs' exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct.

Id. at 258.
'9' 192 F.3d 1283.
192

193

Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1287-88.

194/d.

'9'

at 1288.

Id. at 1302 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Note how law

enforcement officials characterize the activists' group Earth First!, an
avid environmental group known for acts of vandalism and civil
disobedience, as a "violent terrorist" organization. Id.
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spreading misinformation, evincing a desire to cast their
group in a negative light, and thus harming its activities. 96
B. Applicability in Protester Cases
Following Mendocino Environmental Center, a
federal court in Oregon concluded that a high school
football coach's abuses toward a student whose parents had
complained of earlier mistreatment would lead ordinary
people in the parents' position to refrain from further
condemnation of the coach's practices to protect their son
from further harm. 197 Denying the football coach's motion
to dismiss, the court found that the coach had engaged in
"verbal tirades and emotionally abusive conduct" toward
the plaintiffs' son and other players during a summer
training camp. 198 After the plaintiffs complained, the coach
turned the student's teammates against him, encouraged
other parents to verbally attack the plaintiffs, and called the
student into an equipment room, locked the door, and
verbally abused the boy. 199
Many of the cases applying the "ordinary firmness"
standard involve retaliation. However, this standard was
recently followed in a protester case as well. 200 A district
court in Los Angeles found that the LAPD's preventing
ingress to and egress from demonstrations during the 2000
Democratic National Convention, blocking protesters from
196 id.

Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130
(D. Ore. 2003).
198 Id. at 1123.
199 The coach turned the teammates against the plaintiffs' son by falsely
telling them that his parents had accused him of racism. This is
significant because the plaintiffs' son was one of five AfricanAmerican players on a team of 120 students. Team members
threatened the plaintiffs' son with physical harm, chastised and isolated
him, and the coached harassed him during school hours in front of his
friends. Id. at 1124.
200 E.g., Crawford-El, 93 F.3d 813.
See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192
F.3d at 1300 (collecting decisions).
197
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using sidewalks, and using low-flying helicopters that
interfered with speakers' ability to communicate "permits a
reasonable inference that [the LAPD's] acts would deter a
participating in future
person of ordinary firmness' 20 from
1
First Amendment activities."
If government intent to chill speech can be found
when law enforcement officials call environmental activists
"terrorists" and otherwise spread misinformation about
their group, 20 2 it is equally likely that the intent to chill
could be found when mayors and police officials liken
protesters to terrorists and say that they take to the streets to
get arrested.20 3 If a person of ordinary firmness would be
chilled from engaging in free speech because a coach is
harassing her son, 204 then a partygoer would be deterred
from protected expression because he was arrested after
saying "I can't believe what is happening" while police
were breaking up a party. 20 5 If a mayor's campaign against
topless bars and their owners, silences the expression of a
policeman's
paramour, 206 then
surely
assaulting
Nat'l Lawyers Guild, No. CV-01-6877 FMV (granting in part and
denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment).
201

202 Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1287-88.
203 See supra Part III.A.

204 Cain, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
205 Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
206 Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74 (2d. Cir. 1998). To be accurate,
the court here did not find a First Amendment violation, in part because
the plaintiff's 89-page complaint was "an omnium gatherum,
obsessively repetitious, overwrought in tone, and organized like a front
hall closet." Id. at 82. But the court affirmed in part the lower court's

judgment denying the public official defendants' motion to dismiss on
grounds of qualified immunity, giving the plaintiff another chance to
replead "in a way that would organize the issues." Id. In another case
decided on the same doctrine, neighbors opposed to a Berkeley,

California, multi-family housing proposal expressed their concerns
publicly that the project would house substance-abusing or mentally
disabled persons. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).
The neighbors wrote the Berkeley City Council, spoke out at public
meetings, and published a newsletter critical of the project, prompting
an eight-month investigation by local officials of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who believed that the
neighbors had violated the Fair Housing Act by distributing
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demonstrators with pepper spray, shooting them with
rubber bullets, rounding them up in plastic orange nets, and
detaining them in substandard conditions would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from returning to the streets to
As previously
engage in protected expression. 20 7
mentioned, a court found it plausible that some LAPD
actions did just that during the 2000 Democratic National
Convention. 2 8 Therefore, even taking into account the
need to maintain street order and security, the vast array of
recent government actions taken against protesters, as
described in Part III, supra, so chill expression that they
readily could be found to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in future protected speech. Thus,
these actions arguably violate the First Amendment.
V. Fencing the Public Forum: Protest Pens,
Viewpoint Exclusion, Privatization
Harsh street tactics are not the only governmental
acts that have taken a toll on First Amendment expression.
The government has further muted voices of dissent in
"discriminatory" newsletters and flyers. Id. at 1220, 1221 (internal
quotation marks omitted). During the investigation, HUD officials
interrogated the neighbors
under threat of subpoena about their views and public
statements regarding the challenged project; directed them to
produce an array of documents and information, including all
involved parties' names, addresses, and telephone numbers
and all correspondence or other documents relating to their
efforts in opposition to the project; informed them and a major
metropolitan newspaper that they had violated the Fair
Housing Act; and advised them to accept a "conciliation
proposal" that required them to cease all litigation and the
distribution of "discriminatory" newsletters and flyers.
Id. at 1220. The court concluded that the HUD's actions "would have
chilled or silenced" a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
future activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1229.
207 See supra Part Il.B.
208

See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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public places by eliminating key portions of the public
forum, relegating dissenters to portions of the public forum
that are less visible to the targets of their speech than
portions accorded supporters of the government's policies
or non-allied members of the public, and yanking the forum
for expression out from under the public's feet through
privatization.
A. Protest Pens:20 9The Ghettoization of
Demonstration
Protest pens, otherwise known as protest zones or
demonstration zones, essentially are a legacy of the WTO
protests in Seattle.21 °
Courts have split on the
constitutionality of their use. To the extent to which they
keep protesters at a distance from their intended audience
and hinder the protestors' ability to communicate their
message, they have been struck down. For example, in Bay
Area Peace Navy v. United States,2 1 1 a case that preceded
the WTO protests by nearly a decade, the plaintiffs, a group
of boaters, displayed their disagreement with U.S. military
policy by displaying signs, having children sing anti-war
songs, and conducting a theatrical production on their
vessels in front of a San Francisco pier from which high
government officials were watching a parade of Naval
ships. 212 The government claimed that a 75- to 100-yard
buffer around the pier imposed by the Coast Guard was
needed to protect against terrorist acts.

213

However, the

court found that the buffer zone was not narrowly tailored
because it "burden[ed] substantially more speech than
Mitchell, supra note 11 at *38.
Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
211 914 F.2d 1224.
212 The demonstrators paraded in formation in pleasure craft ranging
from kayaks to 30-foot boats while the Naval display took place farther
out in the San Francisco Bay. Id. at 1225-26.
209
210

113 Id. at

1227.
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[was] necessary to further the government's legitimate

interests." 214 The court found the government's argument
unpersuasive because its references to terrorist or other
violent incidents were unrelated to events in the San
Francisco area (or even in the United States). It upheld a
lower court injunction limiting the buffer zone to no more
Some subsequent decisions have
than 25 yards. 2 15
followed this court's reasoning.
1. Protest Zones Found
Unconstitutional
Haunted by images of Seattle in 1999, Los Angeles
officials the following year developed a 185-acre security
zone around the venue for the Democratic National
Convention, relegating demonstrators to a protest pen 260
yards away. 2 16 In Service Employee InternationalUnion v.
City of Los Angeles, the court granted an injunction against
the security zone because its vastness did not render it
narrowly tailored enough to serve the government's
significant interest in delegate safety. The court also
reasoned that the distant protest pen did not provide an
adequate alternate means of communication. 217 According
to the court, "although it may be more convenient for
delegates to have exclusive access to the immediate area,
convenience can never predominate over the First
Amendment." 218 The court further noted that the time
restriction against speech would have been "absolute" had
the 185-acre security zone been built because it would have
The Peace Navy's
message could not effectively be conveyed at a distance of 75 yards
"because the audience on the pier could neither read the banners nor
hear
the boatload of children singing." Id. at 1226.
215
Id. at 1226, 1227-28, 1231.
21
6 Service Employee Int'l Union, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 968, 971.
217 I. at 971-72.
218 Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
214 Id. at 1227 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
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blocked expressive activities 24 hours a day.2 19
Acknowledging that the content neutrality of the security
area was not argued, the court nonetheless noted that it
"ha[d] its doubts regarding the zone's neutrality" because
free speech would have been permitted in the zone only to
those with access. 220 The court in Stauber v. City of New
York 2211 also shared this view. 222
The Stauber court agreed that the use of protest
pens is not narrowly tailored to serve the government's
interest in public order because it places an unreasonable
limit on the movement of demonstrators. 223 The New York
Police Department (NYPD) has created large pens using
interlocking metal barricades that run the length of the

219id.
220

Id. at 970 n. 1.

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350.
"Had the plaintiffs objected that particular police officers were
making decisions relating to the provision of access information or to
ingress and egress [to the protest pens used in a 2003 anti-war
demonstration in New York] for reasons relating to the content of the
demonstrator's speech, the objection would be appropriate. The
plaintiffs, however, have made no such objection." Id at *60.
Professor Mitchell expresses a similar view, offering the following
provocative queries:
221

222

If the streets 'from time immemorial' have been the place
where people debate and discuss, protest and rally, then how is
it that now it is only on some streets (or even some parts of the
streets) where this is possible, while on other streets - the
streets where the decisions are made that direct our lives - the
right to dissident speech is outlawed outright? Indeed, in the
end, isn't protest zoning really just a way of controlling the
content of debate without really acknowledging that that is
what is being done, by, for example, privileging the right of
WTO ministers to meet [in Seattle] and to speak over the right
of protest groups to contest that speech?
Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
223 Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *80. Because the court
found that the city's restriction was not narrowly tailored, it declined to
reach whether the city provided adequate alternative means of
expression. Id.
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block and have an exit at one end.22 4 When a pen fills up
with protesters, the police physically close off the entrance
and require participants to enter a pen farther from the
center of the demonstration.225 As a result, protesters
cannot leave the pens, even to use the restroom or to get
food or water, without risking separation from those with
whom they attended; at times, police block access
altogether, driving people to give up and leave.2 26 Thus,
some groups have tried to keep their events small and omit
227
the use of a sound system to avoid NYPD involvement.
The Stauber court enjoined the NYPD's use of the pens
because the practice unreasonably restricted access to and
participation in protests.228
While the constitutionality of the use of protest pens
frequently turns, in significant part, on whether those
engaged in political speech are able to effectively reach
their audience, 229 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also considered the importance of the location of
speech as a component of its content in determining the
constitutionality of time, place, and manner restrictions. 230
The court in Galvin ruled that the government's relegation
of a San Francisco prayer group that was protesting the
demolition of housing on federal land to a protest pen 150
to 175 yards away from the originally selected location was
231
not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest.
The court found that where location is "an essential part of
the message sought to be conveyed," a court must consider
Id. at *6, *25-*26. Protesters are expected to assemble in the pens,
which may hold about 4,000 people "shoulder-to-shoulder" per block.
Id. at *25.
225 Id. at *25-*27.
226 Furthermore, "once pens are full, people experience considerable
problems getting out of the pens." Id. at *26.
7Id. at *28.
224

228

229

Id. at *95.
See infra Part V.B. 1.

230

Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 749-56 (9th Cir. 2004).

231

Id. at 743.
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the degree to which the regulation in question distorts the
message.232 The court concluded that "there [was] a strong
First Amendment interest in protecting the right of citizens
to gather in traditional public forum locations that [were]
critical to the content of their message, just as there [was] a
strong interest in protecting
speakers seeking to reach a
233
audience."
particular

Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that choice of communicative aspects, message,
and manner are best left to the individual. Id. at 750 (citing Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)) (presuming that
speakers, not the government, best know what they want to say and
how to say it). Unfortunately, a New York district court failed to
follow this policy, allowing the government to determine how a protest
was to be held, rather than allowing the planners to decide. United for
Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d. 19 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Specifically, the court upheld New York City's restriction of an
antiwar demonstration in a plaza rather than a march along city streets.
Id. at 20-21, 30-31. The plaintiffs argued that a march is a "time
honored tradition in New York City and perhaps the single most
important method of demonstrating large public support for a particular
cause." Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is true that a
district court in New York, located in the Second Circuit, need not
follow the Ninth Circuit in which the Galvin case was decided.
However, the view expressed in Galvin that a court must consider the
extent to which a regulation distorts a group's message, where location
is an essential part of the message, is persuasive authority in a case with
facts such as those in Unitedfor Peace & Justice. The demonstrators
chose the street as a venue for their march, and they did so to
communicate that as many as 100,000 or more New Yorkers are so
opposed to the war in Iraq that they are willing to brave the frigid
February weather to communicate this sentiment. Id. at 20, 30. Under
the rule in Galvin, the government has no business taking that choice
away. Perhaps this New York court is too caught up in the fear of
terrorism that has pervaded government since the September 11, 2001
attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.
The court cited
"heightened security concerns due to September 11 th" as a reason for
upholding the city's prohibition on the antiwar march. Id. at 28-29.
Because they live at the site of the major portion of the September 11th
attacks, it is understandable that some New Yorkers continue to live in
fear that their city may be targeted for another attack producing a mass
loss of life. However, that does not rightly provide an excuse for the
government to place excessive limits on core political expression, as
allowed by the court in Unitedfor Peace & Justice.
233 Id. at 752.
232
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2. Hollow Victory: Dissenters
Reduced to Negotiating for the
Public Forum
Both the Stauber and the Service Employees
International Union courts reached the correct result by
finding that the cities' practices unconstitutionally
restricted free expression. Professor Mitchell argues that
the latter case, which was decided in 2000 just months after
the WTO protests in Seattle, turned out to be a hollow
While the Los
victory for free-speech advocates. 234
Angeles protesters won the ability to demonstrate near the
targets of their speech, the case leaves future groups in the
position of having to negotiate with government officials
over which part of the public forum the government will
allow them to engage in protected speech.2 3 5
One protest group that sought to demonstrate on the
Great Lawn in New York's Central Park declined to
negotiate over geography. The court refused to grant an
injunction overturning the city's denial of a permit to use
the Great Lawn for a protest against the 2004 Republican
National Convention. 236 The court seemed almost huffy at
the groups' refusal to negotiate stating, "Simply because
234
235

Mitchell, supra note 11, at 37.
As a result of the case,
[A]dvocates of speech rights [are reduced] to arguing the fine
points of geography, pouring [sic] over maps to determine just
where protest may occur. Protesters are put entirely on the
defensive, always seeking to justify why their voices should
be heard and their actions seen, always having to make a claim
that it is not unreasonable to assert that protest should be
allowed in a place where those being protested against can
actually hear it, and always having to "bend" their tacticsand their rights-to fit a legal regime that in every case sees
protest subordinate to "the general order" (which, of course,
really means the "established order").

supra note 11, at *37.
Mitchell,
236
Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
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Plaintiffs feel that no other location in New York City is
worthy of their cause . . . does not make it So.,,237 In
another case, an organization of dissenters in Philadelphia
found themselves having to negotiate with police and
Secret Service agents for "the right to demonstrate on [a]
public sidewalk" across the street from a facility that the
President was expected to visit. 238 And another group that
attempted to negotiate a protest route for the 2004
Democratic National Convention in Boston got stuck with a
deal so raw that the court itself wrote, "A written
description cannot begin to convey the ambience of the
[demonstration zone] a space redolent of the sensibility
conveyed in Piranesi's
etchings published as Fanciful
2 39
Images of Prisons.,
3. Protest Zones Upheld
Perhaps the most significant protest zone case is
that in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld a 50-block "No Protest Zone" in Seattle during the
1999 WTO meeting in a split decision. 240 The court held
that the Local Proclamation of Civil Emergency Order No.
3, which imposed a limited curfew on downtown Seattle
24 1
streets, was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.
237

Id. at 271.
238 Amended Complaint, Acorn v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312,
para.
40
(E.D.
Pa.
May
6,
2004),
available at
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/acom-edpa-d 10.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Acorn Complaint].
239 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
240 Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1156. The term "No Protest Zone" was used
by city officials, police, and demonstrators to refer to the area in which
anti-WTO demonstrations expressions were banned, but the dissent in
Menotti noted that city officials changed its name to "restricted zone"
once "word came out" that "No Protest Zone" was an "inappropriate
term." Id. at 1158 n.1 (Paez, C.J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 1124-25, 1142-43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon
determining that the "No Protest Zone" was a valid time, place, and
manner restriction, the court declined to consider whether banning
protest in downtown Seattle constituted a prior restraint.
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The majority in Menotti argued that demonstrators had
ample alternate means of communicating their message
both via the media, and because hotels where some WTO
delegates were staying were located outside the "No Protest
Zone." 242 But Judge Paez, writing in dissent, had the better
argument, calling Order No. 3 an "affront to First
Specifically, Judge Paez
Amendment protections. 243
found that Order No. 3 was not narrowly tailored to serve
the government's interest in security because the "No
Protest Zone" "purposely encompassed every place [where
244
protesters] could hope to communicate to delegates.",
Moreover, Judge Paez pointed out that the court had struck
down much smaller buffer zones in the past. 245 The dissent
also found that Order No. 3 did not leave open ample
alternate venues for speech, concluding that "an entire
medium of speech was foreclosed and the WTO protestors
were silenced and relegated to the sidelines. 246
Furthermore, the order was sufficiently vague as to allow
the official charged with enforcing the regulation unduly
broad discretion. 24 7 As to this latter point, the examples
242
243

Id. at 1139 n.49, 1142 n.54.
Id. at 1170. It appears that the majority in Menotti may have felt

either that the dissent was persuasive or was not so secure in its own
reasoning. The majority opinion is peppered with an unusual number
of lengthy footnotes disputing points made by the dissent.
244 Id. at 1168. Judge Paez points out that Order No. 3 lasted longer
than necessary, and that Mayor Schell signed the order in the early
morning hours of December 1, 1999, "long after both violence and
protest activity had subsided." Id. at 1168 n. 9.
45 Id. at 1168, 1168 n. 11(citing Bay Area Peace Navy, 914
F.2d at
1127 (75-yard buffer zone surrounding naval ships in a parade too
large, and 25-yard zone would suffice to serve security interests);
United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
150- to 175-yard distance from entrance to visitor center); Kuba v. 1-A
Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 862 (9th Cir. 2004) (restricting protesters
to small locations more than 200 feet from venue entrance which was
not
24 narrowly tailored)).
6Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1173.

Id. at 1174. Seattle's then-Police Chief Stamper admitted that Order
No. 3 was sufficiently vague that "it made it difficult from a working
cop's point of view to distinguish between who should and who should
247
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Judge Paez proffered in his dissent show that the police
used this discretion to practice de facto viewpoint
discrimination, keeping anyone who evinced any
sort of
24
8
Zone.",
Protest
"No
the
of
out
message
anti-WTO
Five years later, city leaders of Boston, with ghosts
of Seattle no doubt dancing in their heads, put forth a
cavalcade of restrictions that could serve as a checklist of
schemes designed to abridge free expression. First, the city
shut down a federal building adjacent to the convention
venue, as well as the subway, the principal railway station
serving routes to other parts of New England, the Charles
River, and even an Interstate highway for several hours
before and after the convention's daily activities.24 9 On the
not be left out." Id. at 1175.
248 See id. at 1162-67. The story of Martha Ehman is illustrative; she
was an attorney who worked within the "No Protest Zone." Dressed
causually, she was walking to work behind three people in business
suits who passed into the zone without incident. Id. at 1163. Officers
asked where she was going, then allowed her to pass when she told
them where she worked. Id. Once they noticed the words "No WTO"
written in masking tape on her backpack, officers required her to
remove the message or face arrest. Id. In another example, police
refused entry into the zone for a partner at a downtown law office while
he carryied an anti-WTO sign, even after he explained that he owned a
business within the zone; yet, after getting rid of the sign, he walked
through another checkpoint without incident. Id. A schoolteacher
carrying signs that read "Free Trade is Slave Trade" and "Global Cops
for Global Corps" was stopped even though she was outside the "No
Protest Zone." She was surrounded by four or five officers, who ripped
anti-WTO signs off her clothing and backpack, took the signs she was
carrying and broke them, then threatened her with arrest if she did not
"be quiet and leave." Id. at 1164-65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ironically, the city could have used mobile police teams known as
"flying squads" whose duty was to identify and arrest vandals and
violent protesters while leaving the tens of thousands of non-violent
demonstrators to engage in free expression. Id. at 1172. Instead, these
squads were pulled off that duty and ordered to join fixed police lines
within an hour of arriving on the street. Id. "As a result, the relatively
small number of vandals could destroy property without threat of
arrest." Id. (quoting internal police report) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
249 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 65. Surely, if all public transportation
is shut down and auto traffic is compromised by actions as severe as
freeway closures, fewer individuals inclined to express dissenting

59

2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL

OF LAW & POLICY

205

few public streets surrounding the convention site that were
not cut off from public access, the city placed a severe limit
on the number of people allowed to demonstrate. 21 Only a
twenty-foot strip of a main street leading to the convention
site was made available to the public but was cut off from
delegates and officials by an eight-foot-high fence covered
with a material designed to prevent visibility, therefore
even those small demonstration groups located in streets
open to the public were not seen by their intended
audience, the delegates and officials on the other side.25 '
If that was not enough to deter those intent on
expressing dissent, the worst horrors were reserved for
participants with the fortitude to enter the demonstration
zone. The zone "conveys the symbolic sense of a holding
pen where potentially dangerous persons are separated
from others. 252 It is "a place ... not just on the wrong
side of the tracks but literally under them."' 253 Its capacity
was a paltry 1,000 people. 254 The "roof' of the zone was,
at best, as high as an average adult and was supported by a
"forest of girders." 255 The tracks above were bedecked
with razor wire and patrolled by armed police and National
Guard officers. 256 The portion of the zone not located
257
under the tracks was covered overhead by mesh netting.
More significant than the demonstration zone's profoundly
views will be willing or even able to transport themselves to the
convention venue to protest.
250 "Anywhere in the soft zone, leafleting and small stationary
demonstrations of 20 persons or less may be conducted without a
permit. Demonstrations of between 21 and 50 people require a permit."
Id. Police would not let any more than 12,000 protestors in all of the
side streets combined. Id. at 66.
251 Id. at
252 Id. at

65-66.
74-75.

Id. at 74.
The city calculated that 4,000 protestors would fit, but under
questioning by the court, conceded that it "must limit the capacity ..
to
255 no more than 1,000 persons." Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
253

254

id.

256/d.
257 id.
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oppressive nature, however, the remote chance the
delegates would see or hear demonstrators, because the
demonstration zone was set off by a double set of cement
258
barriers, each topped by eight-foot chain-link fences.
The outer fence was covered with mesh supposedly to
prevent liquids from being squirted into the protected area,
but which actually had the effect of impairing visibility,
and altogether preventing leafleting. 25 9 This last effect of
the city's multitude of restrictions, that no one was able to
pass leaflets to delegates and their guests, should fail
constitutional scrutiny because the "[f]reedom to distribute
information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive
it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that,
putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of
time and manner of distribution, it must be fully
preserved.,260 Banishing participants behind a double
fence that resembles a prison holding area goes well
beyond the reasonable police261and health regulations
suggested by the Struthers court.
258 id.
259

According to the court,
Delegates and invited guests arriving or departing via buses on
the opposite or eastern bus row of the terminal will have
essentially no visibility from or to the [demonstration zone]
because of the distance and the mesh screen. By contrast,
those arriving or departing via buses in the western row may
be able to hear and, to some extent, see demonstrators in the
[demonstration zone], depending on precisely which bus they
take and whether they walk in relative proximity to the
[demonstration zone] fence. It will be, however, completely
impossible to pass a leaflet . . . to a delegate or other
[convention] guest, even one who wants to approach the edge
of the [demonstration zone] to receive the literature.

Id. at 68.
260 Struthers, 319 U.S. at 146-47.
261 See id. Struthers concerned an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
distribution of leaflets. If the state is constitutionally disallowed from
prohibiting distribution of circulars door-to-door, then arguably it
cannot, with constitutional blessing, completely prevent dissidents from
passing handbills to important government officials and their guests.
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Nonetheless, in Bl(a)ck Tea Society, the court
262
even though it
upheld Boston's security scheme,
admitted that it could not find that the restrictions on
The
prospective protesters were narrowly tailored.263
court reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgement
that the Stauber court "considered detailed evidence"
before enjoining the use of protest pens in New York,264
and despite the design of the Boston demonstration zone
being labeled "an offense to the spirit of the First
Amendment" and "a brutish and potentially unsafe place
for citizens who wish to exercise their First Amendment
rights. 265 To justify its decision, the court cited a 1986
case upholding barricades to protect those exercising their
First Amendment rights "from those who would prevent its
exercise., 266 The court also based its decision on "past
experience at comparable events" such as the 2000
Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles. 267 These
latter reasons do not provide strong support for issuing a
ruling that the court admits falls shy of constitutional
scrutiny, especially since newspaper accounts from Los
Id. at 149.

Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d. at 77. A more recent case distinguished
Coalition, fnding that a regulation which kept demonstrators between
260 and 265 feet away from the targets of their speech was
unconstitutional. Kuba, 387 F.3d at 854, 863. The Kuba court found
262

that the government's interest in preventing traffic congestion and
ensuring public safety were significant, but "less weighty" than the
"substantial" interest found in the Bl(a)ck Tea Society case. Id. at 858
n.9 (citing Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.
2004)).
263
2

Coalition,327 F. Supp. 2d at 75.

Id. at 74.
265 Id. at 76.
266

Id. at 74 (quoting Oliveri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.

1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 75. The court also based its decision on affidavits from law
enforcement personnel and information the United States government
267

gave the court regarding specific intelligence concerning security
threats kept under seal. Because the plaintiff was unable to confront
the information, the court did not rely on it in making its decision. Id.
at 75 n.2.
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Angeles in 2000 reveal that there were no major injuries
and minimal property damage during the Convention
protests.26 8

The First Circuit expressed its disagreement with
this viewpoint by upholding the Bl(a)ck Tea Society
decision, but the court should be criticized for doing so.
First, while it correctly characterized time, place, or manner
analysis as "intermediate scrutiny," 269 the court applied a
standard closer to a rational basis test. 27
Second, the
appellate panel raised the same concerns as the lower court
regarding harm done during past large gatherings such as
those in 2000 in Los Angeles, which amounted to little
more than injuries sustained by protesters
and
27
1
journalists.
Yet, the court failed to list specific violent
incidents to justify its concerns. 272 Therefore, unlike the
The only injuries reported in Los Angeles were to demonstrators at
the hands of police. See, e.g., William Booth & Rene Sanchez, 2,000
Rally in Streets Against Sweatshops, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2000,
268

at A25 ("Dozens of protesters ...

have been struck by rubber bullets

that police have fired into crowds twice this week."); Paul Pringle,
Week of Demonstrations Closes with Minor Injuries, 190 Arrests, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2000, at A23 ("Some demonstrators
threw rocks and bottles at the police. Officers dispersed the crowd with
batons, pepper spray and rubber bullets, injuring numerous protesters
and journalists."). See also Jim Newton, Police, Critics Clash Over
Use of Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at Al ("no serious injuries, a
smattering of property damage"); V. Dion Haynes & Vincent J.
Schodolski, Immigrants, The Rights of Workers Top Final Rally, CHI.
TRIB.,
Aug. 18, 2000, at 15 (indicating no reports of serious injury).
269
Bl(a)ck Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 12.
270 Id. at 13 ("We turn next to the City's goal, mindful that the
government's judgment as to the best means for achieving its legitimate
objectives deserves considerable respect.").
271 See supra note 268.
272 See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 14. According to the court,
While a government agency charged with public safety
responsibilities ought not turn a blind eye to past experience, it
likewise ought not impose harsh burdens on the basis of
isolated past events. And in striking this balance, trial courts
should remember that heavier burdens on speech must, in
general, be justified by more cogent evidentiary predicates.
On this hastily assembled record, the quantum of "threat"
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decisions in Stauber and Service Employees International
Union,273 the First Circuit found that Boston's security
measures, "though extreme," were narrowly tailored and
274
left open viable alternative means275of communication.
This conclusion is open to question.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination in "Pro-Con"
Cases
Besides employing the constitutionally dubious
tactic of corralling protesters into fenced-off cordons
evidence was sufficient to allow the trier to weigh it in the
balance.
Id. The court continued:
The City claims that the risk of harm was substantial. It
designed the elaborate security measures here at issue in light
of recent past experience with large demonstrations, including
those at the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los
Angeles. The double ranks of fencing were meant to deter
attempts to break through the fence; the liquid dispersal mesh
was intended to protect the delegates from being sprayed with
liquids; and the overhead netting was added to prevent
demonstrators from hurling projectiles. Conduct of this type
admittedly has occurred at a number of recent protests.
Id. at 13. Note that there was no report of attempts to break through the
security fence in Los Angeles in 2000. On the other hand, the author of
this article, then a reporter covering the demonstrations at the 2000
convention, interviewed one man who had been shot six times with
plastic bullets for attempting to climb the fence to post a sign. The
bullets caused quarter-sized welts on his shirtless torso.
273 See supra Part V.A. 1.
274
Bl(a)ck Tea Soc 'y, 378 F.3d at 14.
275 The alternate means of communication mentioned by the court are
dubious. Principally, the court said the delegates could get the
dissidents' message through the television, radio, the press, the Internet,
and other outlets. Id. But for reasons discussed in Part II.B., supra,
these methods do not constitute a viable alternative for citizens of
modest means and are no substitute for street advocacy. Professor
Mitchell concludes, "[N]o matter what the courts say and no matter
how carefully police and the courts together draw the lines of protest,
creating a geography of rights . . . can be frankly oppressive."
Mitchell, supra note 11, at *42.
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sanitaires,276 the government has also engaged in obvious

viewpoint discrimination 277 by creating special protest pens
into which dissidents are shunted. The special protest pens
are distant and often hidden from the protesters' target of
speech, while demonstrators who favor government policy
are allowed within view of elected officials. A variant
from this "pro-con" approach would be to simply banish all
demonstrators of whatever stripe from the public official's
view and allow only those who do not express an opinion
to be located closer to the official.278 While this trend has
accelerated where opponents of President George W.
Bush's policies have attempted to make their views known
to the President, the practice is rooted in the early years of
the Clinton administration.
In Johnson v. Bax,279 a critic of Clinton stood at a
New York street comer near where the President was
speaking, bearing a sign that read "Mr. Clinton: STOP

Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
Justice Kennedy reminds us that viewpoint discrimination is "an
egregious form of content discrimination." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
829. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) ("The principle that has emerged from our
cases 'is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others."') (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
278 This happened, for example, in Seattle following the 1999 WTO
protests that were marred by a small minority's vandalism spree. See
supra note 102. Seattle's mayor called in the National Guard to clear
the streets, declared a state of emergency, and closed public spaces in a
25-block area of the city to all including those who objected to WTO
globalization policies except residents, owners and employees of
businesses, emergency personnel, and, more interestingly from a
viewpoint-discrimination standpoint, WTO delegates (presumably
advocates of WTO policies) and shoppers (presumably voicing no
opinion regarding WTO policies). Mitchell, supra note 11, at *33-*34.
Thus, the mayor's street-closure order amounted to a pro-con scheme
whereby pro-WTO delegates and those with no opinion were allowed
in the very public places from which V/TO opponents were excluded.
279 No. 93 Civ. 3530, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8850, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 25, 1996) (granting an order for a preliminary injunction).
276
277
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CAMPAIGNING AND LEAD! '2 80 Police told the critic
he had to go to a designated protest zone. When he
resisted, the police took away his sign, thereby committing
a "clear violation" of his free-speech rights. 28 The critic
made another sign, returned to the street comer, was again
told to leave and refused, and was subsequently arrested.2 8 2
Police set up "pro" and "anti" demonstration areas, with
which the court had no quarrel, but because police, rather
than the demonstrators themselves, were the ones directing
demonstrators into the pens based on the content of their
speech, the court found the practice impermissible.2 8 3
The Bax court noted that while "spectators" who
cheered in support were allowed to stand across the street
from the President, dissenters were kept at least 75 yards
284
This practice, the court indicated,
away at all times.
appeared to be an unconstitutional discrimination, but the
court was not prepared to rule on this issue. 2 85 While the
police in Bax kept dissidents 75 yards from President
Clinton, which would appear to be unconstitutional under
Bay Area Peace Navy, 286 the George W. Bush
Administration has required dissenters to be as far as one
half mile away from where the President is speaking, while
allowing supporters and those expressing no opinion to
remain closer. 2 87 Faithful to Orwellian tradition, these
280

d. at *2.

281 Id. at *1-2. "The fact that the destruction of Mr. Johnson's sign

was a violation of his First Amendment rights has not been disputed
and the fact that the police officers knowingly violated his right is
evidenced by the professed inability of any of the officers to remember
who took the sign." Id. at *3-*4.
282 The court also found the arrest a "clear violation" of the plaintiff's
First Amendment rights. Police claimed they arrested him for blocking
the sidewalk, but the court found that the record "clearly refutes" the
claim, in part because one of the officers gave testimony that "is not
true." Id. at *3, *4-*6.
283

Id. at *8.

2 4 Id. at

285

*9-* 10 (granting an order for a preliminary injunction).
Id. at *10.

286 See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
287 "These zones routinely succeed in keeping protesters out of
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remote protest pens have been dubbed
"designated free
288
zones.
Amendment"
"First
or
speech"
1. Dissenters Hidden from
Presidential Motorcade
In 2002, for example, police cleared the motorcade
path of all protest signs when President Bush went to
Pittsburgh. While the police allowed supporters to line the
route, they required dissidents to move to a distant baseball
field designated especially for them. 289 Furthermore,
police confiscated the sign of one participant, who was
arrested for disorderly conduct and detained until the
President had left town. 290 A court threw out the disorderly
conduct charge. 29 1 During a hearing, the arresting officer
admitted that he had been instructed by the Secret Service
to direct some protesters, but not others, into the fenced-in
zone. 292 Regarding the zone, the arrestee later told a
reporter for Salon, "I could see these people behind the
fence, with their faces up against it, and their hands on the
wire.... It looked more like a concentration camp than a
free speech area to me, so I said, 'I'm not going in there. I
293
thought the whole country was a free speech area.",,
The Pittsburgh case is not an isolated incident. One
presidential sight and outside the view of the media covering the
event." Bovard, supra note 114.
288 Id.; Complaint, Elend v. Sun Dome Inc., No. 8:03-CV-1657-T23TGW, para. 14 (M.D. Fla. 2005), available at
http://www.voiceoffreedom.com/archives/protestzonefinalcomplaint/fn
lprotestzone.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2005).
289 Bovard, supra note 114.

290 Id.; Transcript of Proceeding, Commonwealth v. Neel, (Oct. 31,
2002)

available at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/neel-

2002-10-31 .html#fn (last visited Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter "Neel
Transcript"].
291 Neel Transcript.
292 id.
293 David Lindoff, Keeping Dissent Invisible,

http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/ 10/16/secretservice/index

_np.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
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protest group provided a court with fifteen examples from
all over the country. 2 94 For example, two grandmothers
were arrested for displaying handwritten signs critical of
President Bush after declining to go to a designated zone
hundreds of yards from the entrance to the venue the
president visited.29 5 In South Carolina, police arrested a
man on "trespassing" charges for holding a "No War For
Oil" sign among hundreds of Bush supporters. 296 He had
refused to remove himself to the designated zone a half
mile from where President Bush was to speak. 297 Although
the state dropped the trespassing charges because they did
not apply to public property, the federal government
remained undaunted and charged the defendant with
entering a restricted area around the President of the United
States, a rarely-enforced law carrying a penalty of six
months incarceration or a $5000 fine. 29 8 There could not
be a clearer case of content discrimination, considering a
"[I]t's the content of your
police officer told the defendant,
299
sign that's the problem."
In addition, an Indiana man who stood near the
entrance to a venue at which Vice President Dick Cheney
was to speak displayed a sign that read "Cheney, 19th
He was arrested on disorderly
Century Energy Man."
to move to a protest zone
refusing
after
conduct charges
30 0
In this case, the court found
500 feet from the entrance.
that the protest zone was not narrowly tailored to serve the
government's interest in safety at the event. 30 1 Moreover,
the court concluded that the protest zone did not constitute
an adequate alternate channel of communication because its
294

Acorn v. City of Philadelphia,No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District

LEXIS 8446, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2004).
295 Bovard,
296 id.
297

id.

298

Id.

supra note 114.

299 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Blair v. City of Evansville, 361 F. Supp. 2d 846 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
31Id.at 859.
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500-foot distance from the venue's parking facilities and
entrance "significantly curtailed" the plaintiffs ability to
convey his message to event patrons, a key component of
his intended audience. 30 2 The government has engaged in
blatant viewpoint discrimination, as the foregoing examples
illustrate, by relegating dissenters to distant designated
zones while allowing supporters and others to be within
view of the President. Furthermore, in at least one
instance, police even forbade the media from entering a
protest area to speak to dissidents and banned protestors
from exiting the zone to express themselves to the
media. 303
2. Court Declines to Enjoin Practices
In Philadelphia, a dissident organization sought to
enjoin the government from keeping its members further
away from the President than where supporters were
allowed.30 4 In one instance, a police line forced dissenting
protesters to stay a third of a block from where a
presidential motorcade was to pass, but allowed supporters
to stand closer. 30 5 In another, police parked several large
vans directly in front of dissenting protesters, ensuring that
the President was unlikely to see them. 306 Government
officials in Philadelphia were subject to a consent decree,
issued in 1988, permanently enjoining them from barring
leafleting and sign-carrying based on the messages
communicated.30 7
The plaintiffs in Acorn sought
declaratory, as well as injunctive relief and an order
requiring government officials to comply with the 1988

302id.
303

Bovard, supra note 114.

304 Acorn, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8446, at *2-*3.

Acorn Complaint at paras. 25, 34, 35, 37, 44-46.
d.
307 Acorn, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *I -'*2.
305

306
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consent decree. 30 8 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim
based on a lack of standing, 30 9 despite conceding that the
government "may indeed have violated" the protesters'
rights. 3 10 The plaintiffs were unable to show a concrete
likelihood that the government would violate their
constitutional rights, or to specify future dates and times of
official events at which violations were likely to occur. 311
While the Acorn court denied a dissident group
standing for purposes of an injunction, the court in Stauber
v. City of New York 3 12 found that the New York Civil
Liberties Union (NYCLU) had standing because it
sponsored protest events in the past and planned to do so in
the future. 3 13 The Stauber court further found that the
plaintiffs in that case sufficiently alleged impairment for
the purposes of standing by demonstrating that the
challenged government practices "may prevent the NYCLU
from expressing its message as forcefully as it would in the
absence of the practices." 314 Clearly, the standard followed
in Stauber requiring that plaintiffs show they are in the
business of sponsoring political-speech events and that the
government may impair their expressions, is less stringent
than the specification of future events by time and date
required in Acorn. Thus, Stauber enunciated the more
correct and just standard. The Acorn court effectively
conceded that its standard is unlikely to be met when it
noted that plaintiffs "usually cannot learn of the scheduling
of such events 31in5 sufficient time to enable them to obtain
judicial relief.
Moreover, the Acorn court appears to improperly
308

Id. at *3-*4

309 Id. at *7.
31
0

Id. at *7.
Id. at *6-*7. "In my view, plaintiffs' claims are too amorphous to
be justiciable at this point in time." Id. at *7.
312 See Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350.
313 Id. at *40.
311

3 14

315

id.

Acorn, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *5.
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rely on the fact that Secret Service regulations forbid 316
its
viewpoint.
on
based
speech
regulating
agents from
Essentially, the court instructs the plaintiffs to sue
individual Secret Service agents over First Amendment
violations, finding that "no useful purpose would be
served" by entering a declaratory judgment to the effect
that the Secret Service must not engage in viewpoint
discrimination 317 This finding is questionable, as "the
internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not
mandated by statute or the constitution, do not confer
substantive rights on any party." 318 Because the internal
regulations of the Secret Service were unlikely to confer
rights on the plaintiffs, the declaratory judgment that the
Acorn plaintiffs sought would have served a useful
purpose.
Courts in the future should not follow Acorn, but
should look to Stauber for guidance. If courts follow
Acorn, most protest groups will be unable to specify a
future likelihood of viewpoint discrimination required by
that court, despite ample evidence that the Secret Service is
engaging in a practice of banishing dissenters to remote
fields or pens while allowing supporters to congregate
much closer to the President. Furthermore, this issue
should be heard by the Supreme Court; otherwise, the
President could elude dissenters by avoiding or rarely
visiting those jurisdictions which, through their equitable
powers, might forbid the Secret Service from violating the
Constitution. Better yet, Congress could accomplish the
goal of requiring equal treatment of all who engage in
political speech by passing a statute that punishes
government officials who discriminate by viewpoint with
316 Id. at *6. "[T]he Secret Service has elaborate written guidelines
which specifically provide for non-discrimination on the basis of the
views sought to be expressed by the protesters." Id.
317 Id. at *6.
Agents who violate Secret Service policy cannot
successfully assert a qualified-immunity defense. Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir.
1990).

318
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sanctions like incarceration or stiff fines.
C. Privatization: Theft of the Public Forum
While determining whether an outdoor space is a
street, sidewalk, or park, and thus a traditional public
forum, should not raise many questions, the advent of
public-private partnerships as a substitute for public
investment has begun to blur the line between public and
private spaces. While the Supreme Court is not likely to
countenance an outright ban on expression in traditionally
public places, it has allowed speech restrictions on private
property, even if heavily trafficked by the public. For
example, after Congress stripped certain free-speech
activities from the Supreme Court building and grounds,
the Court responded by declaring the law unconstitutional
319
when applied to the sidewalks surrounding the building.
The Court pointed out that there was no fence or other form
of delineation that marked the sidewalks surrounding the
320
Court's grounds as "some special type of enclave."
Congress "may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public
and parks which have historically
forum' status of streets
32 1
forums."
public
been
319 "The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court

grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such
for First Amendment purposes." United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
180 (1983). The statute at issue provided, "It shall be unlawful to
parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme
Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or
device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party,
organization, or movement." Id. at 173 (quoting 63 Stat. 617 § 6)
codified at 40 U.S.C. § 13k).
2°Id. at 180.
321 Id. (quoting United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic
Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
According to the court,
The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of
[section] 13k's prohibition, however, results in the destruction
of public forum status that is at least presumptively
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court treats private
spaces differently. For example, despite the increased
function of shopping malls during the late 20th century as a
central gathering place for Americans, the Court has ruled
that these private properties lie outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,322 the
Court reversed an Oregon district court's injunction
prohibiting a shopping mall owner from interfering with
peaceful, noncommercial handbilling by draft and anti-war
demonstrators. The Court held that private property, such
as a mall, does not "lose its private character merely
because the public is generally invited to use it for
' 323
designated
purposes.324
In doingin so,
Marsh v. Alabama.
Writing
1972it distinguished
for the four
impermissible. Traditional public forum property occupies a
special position in terms of First Amendment protection and
will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason
that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a
use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the
government transform the character of the property by the
expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what
might be considered a nonpublicforum parcel ofproperty.
Id. (emphasis added).
Interestingly, in dissent Justice Stevens
counseled judicial restraint, contending that the Court should not have
ruled on section 13k's constitutionality, because the statute did not
reach the activities in which either defendant allegedly engaged. Id. at
188-89 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One of
the defendants was threatened with arrest for distributing leaflets and
handbills, which has nothing to do with the display of "any flag, banner
or other device" proscribed in the statute, because "only after the
material left [defendant's] possession would his message have become
intelligible." Id. at 188 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). The other defendant did
display a device, Justice Stevens reasoned, but because her sign merely
recited verbatim the text of the First Amendment, it could not be said to
have been "designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party,
organization, or movement." Id.
322 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
323 Id. at 569. The Court reasoned, "The essentially private character of
a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by
virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modem
shopping center." Id.
324 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (upholding the right to distribute
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dissenting votes in Lloyd, Justice Marshall sounded a
prophetic note when he concluded:
It would not be surprising in the future to
see cities rely more and more on private
businesses to perform functions once
performed by governmental agencies. The
advantage of reduced expenses and an
increased tax base cannot be overstated. As
governments rely on private enterprise,
public property decreases in favor of
It becomes
privately owned property.
harder and harder for citizens to find means
to communicate with other citizens.
When there are no effective means of
communication, free speech is a mere
I believe that the First
shibboleth.
Amendment requires it to be a reality. 325
Four years later, the Court extended Lloyd and held
that strikers were not allowed into a shopping mall to picket
their employer, a shoe retailer. 326 Nonetheless, some jurists
have urged that because shopping malls do function as
public gathering places, mall owners have a reduced
expectation of privacy and therefore must allow political
expression. 327 Answering the Supreme Court's invitation
leaflets in company-owned towns).
Justice
325 Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Marshall further advocated that the court continue to follow Marsh and
hold that "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it." Id. (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
326
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
327 E.g., Eastwood Mall v. Slanco, 626 N. E. 2d. 59, 62 (Ohio 1994)
(Wright, J., dissenting) (advocating the application of a time, place, or
manner analysis to achieve an appropriate balance between the mall
owner's property rights and the public's free-speech rights). Justice
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to employ alternate analyses or read their own constitutions
more broadly than the Supreme Court interprets the federal
Constitution, 328 a few states, namely California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Washington, have recognized a limited right to free
expression at privately owned shopping malls.32 9 The
California Supreme Court held that that state's Constitution
"protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised" in
privately owned shopping centers. 330 Professor O'Neill
predicted that because the First Amendment does not reach
private spaces, the battle over the contours of speechrelated access to the increasingly privatized
public space
331
will be fought on a state-by-state basis.
1. Hoarding Horton Plaza
One such battle over privatized public space took
place over Horton Plaza Park in San Diego, California.332
Wright noted:
When one thinks about how a shopping mall actually
functions, the enclosed common areas within the mall are
comparable to the town square of yesteryear surrounded by
downtown stores.... [C]itizens, because of the public nature
of a mall, have a heightened expectation that they are
permitted to engage in some forms of speech activities.
Id. at 67.
328 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982).
329 O'Neill, supra note 82, at 455. See also Horton Plaza Assoc. v.
Playing for Real Theatre, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (Cal. App. 1986)
(collecting decisions). Ten other states have not recognized this limited
right.
O'Neill, supra note 82, at 455-56.
33
°Robbins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
This is based on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (granting every person the
right to "freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right") and CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 3(a) (granting right to "petition government for redress
of grievances"). See also id. at 345-46.
331 O'Neill, supra note 82, at 456.
332 Horton Plaza Assoc., 228 Cal. Rptr. 817. See also Mitchell, supra
note 11, at *17-*26 (reviewing Horton Plaza).
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In an attempt to revitalize commercial activity in the

downtown area, San Diego leaders permitted the
development of a shopping mall adjacent to Horton Plaza
333
Park, designed to serve as the mall's pedestrian entrance.
To increase the odds of the mall's financial success, the
city altered the park's landscaping and furniture by
removing benches and replacing lawn areas with prickly
plants, attempting to make the park a less inviting place to
gather, thereby encouraging people to pass through Horton
Plaza Park and into the eponymous shopping mall.3 34
Thus, the effect of the mall's opening in 1985, as well as
the owner's goal in opening it, "was to move public life
inside, to335capture it really, for its own commercial
interests."

In a nod to Pruneyard,the shopping mall owners set
up highly restrictive permit limitations to govern political
expression. 3 36 The Playing for Real Theatre applied for a
333
334

Mitchell, supra note 11, at *22.
The redesign "simply made it impossible to hang out in the park."

Id.

Id. at *21-*22, *26.
Horton Plaza Assoc., 228 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21. Restrictions recited
by the court include:
311

336

(1) Only one permit to any one person or group or
organization will be issued per day. (2) A permit shall allow
the holder to use only the portion of center property expressly
designated and specified in the permit. (3) The office of the
Center manager shall have the power to deny a request for a
permit if the manager in good faith believes the proposed
Political Expression to be profane, indecent, disturbing,
offensive, in poor taste, or otherwise not conducive to the
controlled business environment of the shopping center. (4)
The number of persons who may engage in Political
Expression in the Center at the same time shall be determined
by the owner. Such number shall be determined with reference
to the space provided in the designated area and the number of
separate groups engaged in such activity at the same time. In
no event shall more than two persons from any one group
occupy space in the designated area at the same time. (5) No
permits will be issued between Thanksgiving and December
31st of any calendaryear.
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permit to perform a ten-minute skit in the mall re-enacting
the U.S. bombings of El Salvador. The skit involved eight
actors and included leafleting as part of the skit. 337 The
mall manager denied the request for the play, but approved
the leafleting. 338 The theater group neither dispersed
handbills nor put on the play, yet based on a tip from an
unnamed police informant that the group planned to create
a disturbance and engage in violence in the shopping mall,
its owner sued the group. The mall owner won a
preliminary injunction against any dramatic performances
by the group and required 72 hours advance notice for any
leafleting.
In Horton Plaza, the court distinguished
Pruneyard and similar cases, limiting their holdings to
protect only leafleting and signature-gathering, and not
"expressive conduct" such as putting on plays. 340 The
dissent in Horton Plaza chided the majority for upholding a
prior restraint of political speech and for buying the story,
"based on double and triple hearsay statements," that the
theater group planned to create a disturbance. 34 ' Therefore,
Horton Plaza serves as a warning that creeping
privatization of public spaces heralds a concomitant muting

Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 828 (Butler, J., dissenting).
338 id.
339
Id. at 820-22, 828.
340

Id. at 824.

34 1 Horton

Plaza Assoc., 228 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (Butler, J., dissenting).
Justice Butler added, "Chicken Little and Henny Penny are alive and
well." Id. Justice Butler further noted:
Finally, this case comes to us in a plain wrapper. The content
is sterile. [Defendant] Phipps and his Theatre cohorts did not
protest the denial of the permit to put on the play and they did
not leaflet as allowed by issuance of the second permit.
Hearing bumps in the night, Horton Plaza seeks to exorcise
phantoms of its imagination. Our review should await an
actual controversy.
Id. at 832-833 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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342
of dissenting voices.

2. New York: The Great Grass
Debate
As the twentieth century progressed, courts came to
the conclusion that property rights, though vital, were not
as important as personal rights when considering whether
to rule in equity. Relatively early in the century, a Texas
court announced that "personal rights of citizens are
infinitely more sacred and by every test are of more value
343
than things that are measured by dollars and cents."
Toward the middle of the twentieth century, the California
Supreme Court commented that treating property rights

more favorably than personal rights bespeaks a doctrine
"wholly

at odds with the fundamental principles of
democracy," 344 especially in cases involving First
This doctrinal development
Amendment rights. 345
342

See Mitchell, supra note 11, at *26.

343 Hawkes v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See

also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The powers
of the courts to strike down an offending law is no less when the
interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental personal
rights of free speech and assembly.").
3 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 180 P.2d 321, 325 (1947).
Whether to grant equitable relief "should not in logic or justice turn
upon the sole proposition that a personal rather than a property right is
involved. .

.

. These concepts of the sanctity of personal rights are

specifically protected by the Constitutions, both state and federal, and
the courts have properly given them a place of high dignity, and worthy
of especial protection." Id.
345 In one of those cases, the Supreme Court observed:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press
and religion ...

we remain mindful of the fact that the latter

occupy a preferred position. As we have stated before, the
right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First
Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by free
men."
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted). See also Robbins, 592 P.2d
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represented a move away from the common law
requirement that a plaintiff assert a Property interest before
a court would grant an injunction.
Yet, in this nascent
century, especially where the rights of dissidents are
concerned, what is old apparently is new again.
For example, in National Council of Arab
Americans v. City of New York, the court denied protest
groups the use of the Great Lawn in New York's Central
Park, made extensive reference to the threat posed by a
mass rally on the Great Lawn, and appeared far more
concerned about the condition of the grass than about the
groups' free-speech rights. 347 The court expressly pointed
out that the Great Lawn was restored in 1997 at a cost of
more than $18 million. 348 Whether the city got its money's
worth is questionable because it was only after the
restoration that the city imposed restrictions on the size of
crowds allowed in the park and required that events be
canceled if they take place during or shortly following
rainy weather. 349 What the court did not mention was that
at 347 ("the public interest in peaceful speech outweighs the desire of
?roperty
owners for control over their property").
46
See Hawkes, 265 S.W. at 237. Here, the court noted:
The rule that equity will not afford relief by injunction except
where property rights are involved is known chiefly by its
breach rather than by its observance; in fact, it may be
regarded as a fiction, because courts with greatest uniformity
have based their jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights
nominally on an alleged property right, when, in fact, no
property rights were invaded. This is, in our opinion, as it
should be ....

Id.
347 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 261-64, 270.
348 Id. at 263.
141 Id. at 261, 263-64. The court, shown "dramatic photographs"
by
city officials of a pre-restoration Great Lawn in a beleaguered state,
appeared concerned that the park not return to those "dust bowl" days.
Id. at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, other park
areas such as East Meadow offer all-weather capability. Id. at 262.
The cancellation requirement in rainy weather for events scheduled on
the Great Lawn is especially puzzling given that Central Park
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some of the $18 million needed to complete the restoration
came largely from private corporate donors, who were
allowed to use the Great Lawn for their large events, unless
the grass was wet. 350 In communicating with the plaintiffs,
the city emphasized that underlying its use-restriction plan
was the idea that "restoration accomplished through
significant public and private investment can be
Thus, while National Council of Arab
preserved.135
Americans is a decision ostensibly based on a time, place,
or manner analysis under which the court found the city's
restriction reasonable, the subtext of the decision appears to
be that where private donors help or principally fund an
improvement to a public park, private functions will
receive precedence over free-speech activities. 352 Most
experiences frequent wet weather, averaging approximately an inch of
rain a week during summer months. See National Weather Service,
Normals and Extremes, Central Park, New York, 1869 to present,
available at
http://www.erh.noaa.gov/okx/climate/records/nycnormals.htm.
350 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 263; Complaint,
Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 6602,
paras. 8, 16, 47, 59, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at
http://www.arab-american.net/pdffiles/First AmendedComplaint.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Nat'l Council of Arab Ams.
Complaint"].
351 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. Complaint, at para. 51 (internal
marks omitted).
quotation
32
1 City officials contended that the predicted 250,000 rally participants
that the plaintiffs sought to permit would "decimate" the Great Lawn
and require a lengthy closure. Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F.
Supp. 2d at 264. On the other hand, the city boasted in a press release,
cited in the opinion, that the restored lawn "consist[ed] of
approximately twelve acres of 'hearty' Kentucky blue grass," soil
engineered to resist compaction, and more than four linear miles of
The plaintiffs
Id. at 263.
subsurface drainage infrastructure.
challenged the propriety of the apparent partial privatization of Central
Park:
Although the corporate donors may feel a sense of private
ownership over the Park and do not want to be 'paying' to
host a demonstration that may strongly advocate against their
perceived interests the [Central Park Conservatory] may not
act to deny protest permits on the Great Lawn in order to
protect its relationships with such donors. The Park remains a
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disconcerting, however, is that the court seemed to bolster
its decision not to grant an injunction by noting that if the
city permitted protestors to use the Great Lawn, dissedent
groups might encourage more people to attend their
event. 353 This approach appears to be little more than a
pretext to quell dissent. After all, a primary function of a
public forum such as Central Park is to accommodate
political expression, and the city's decision to close the
park to expressive activity, in part, because opening the
park might encourage more expression, offends the very
interest in free speech that a public forum is supposed to
accommodate.
3. Leaving Las Vegas to the
Privateers
Much like New York City did in obtaining private
money to refurbish the Great Lawn, Las Vegas, attempting
to reverse the declining economic fortunes of its "frumpy"
and dated downtown, redeveloped the area using a privatepublic financing scheme. 354 The result was a five-block
pedestrian zone closed to traffic, dubbed the "Fremont
public forum for all and is not privatized or subject to the
discriminatory urges of [the conservatory's] corporate
sponsors.
Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. Complaint, at para. 59.
353 The court quoted the following statement that plaintiffs made at trial
in their opinion:
If this Court was to rule that the Great Lawn is not off limits
for political legal mass assembly protest, there would be a
surge of excitement and enthusiasm, and we don't know what
the palpable impact of that would be . . . a lot of people who
might not at this moment think about coming to Central Park a
week before would find a way to get there.
Nat'7 Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
354 ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1077 (2004).
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Street Experience." Wishing to minimize interference with
commercial activity such as shopping in the new pedestrian
zone, however, the city outlawed various free-speech
activities, including leafleting, solicitation, and setting up a
table in a public space to distribute literature or collect
signatures (a practice called "tabling").355 After police
dispersed a small rally called to protest the restrictions, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada sued.3 56
The district court that declared a pedestrian mall is a
nonpublic forum, upheld the solicitation, and tabled the
bans while denying summary judgment to the city on the
The court reasoned that the
leafleting prohibition.
leafleting prohibition probably violated the First
Amendment even under the more relaxed standard of
scrutiny for nonpublic fora. 357 The lower court determined
that the pedestrian mall was a nonpublic forum because:
(1) the city had created it for the purpose of stimulating
economic growth and "not for the purpose of promoting
expression"; (2) the $70 million spent on the
redevelopment project represented a "great expense"; and
(3) the textured pavement and overhead canopy
redeveloped area from surrounding streets
distinguished the
358
and sidewalks.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
this reasoning, holding that the Fremont Street Experience
was a public forum as were other commercialized
pedestrian malls, such as the Venice Beach Boardwalk and
Olivera Street in Los Angeles, and Fisherman's Wharf and
Union Square in San Francisco. 35 9 Although United States
appellate courts apply "a jumble of overlapping factors"
when determining public forum status, they typically
355 Id. at
356 id.
35 7

1095, 1096.

Id. at 1096.

358/d.

In such determinations, courts consider historical use. Id. at 110304, 1106.
359
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consider compatibility of the uses of the forum with
expressive activity. 360 Public thoroughfares, such as the
Fremont Street pedestrian mall in Las Vegas, are
"inherently compatible" with free speech. 361 Courts also
seek to protect the reasonable expectation that speech will
be protected where a location in question is
indistinguishable from other public fora.3 62 Even the use of
distinctive pavement and landscaping is not sufficient to
change the character of a public forum. 363 The appellate
court concluded,
"The Fremont Street Experience is still a
364
street."

Perhaps more noteworthy than the court's holding
was that it echoed the concern voiced thirty-one years
earlier by Justice Marshall, which states that as cities are
drawn unresistingly down the path of financing public
projects with private funds, citizens may encounter greater
36 5
difficulty in effectively communicating their views.
"Although governmental attempts to control speech are far
from novel, they have new potency in light of societal
360
36 1

Id. at 1099-1100.

Id. at 1101.
"The recognition that certain government-owned property is a public
forum provides open notice to citizens that their freedoms may be
exercised there without fear of a censorial government, adding tangible
reinforcement to the idea that we are a free people." Id. at 1100
(quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
362

363 Id. at 1102.

364 Id. at 1103. This reasoning echos that of an earlier U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, in which the city of Los Angeles
sought to limit a man's leafleting in El Pueblo de Los Angeles State
Historic Park, which encompasses Olivera Street, a tourist-oriented
commercial area. Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 57274 (9th Cir. 1993). The city argued that Olivera Street "is a distinctive
section of the park, with a unique historic and cultural atmosphere
which is designed to foster commercial exchange." Id. at 576. The
court found this argument "unconvincing," noting that the Olivera
Street area "is still part of the park and it is indistinguishable from other
sections of the park in terms of visitors' expectations of its public
forum status." Id.
365 See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
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privatization." 3 66
toward
trends
and
changes
Unfortunately, this new potency has had a negative impact
on the ability of dissidents to express themselves, as seen
with respect to the Great Lawn in New York 367 and the
Diego. 368
San
in
Plaza
Horton
D. Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel: Viewpoint
Discrimination Meets Privatization
While the Supreme Court in United States v. Grace
cut governmental attempts to destroy the public forum
status of places traditionally used as public fora, more
recent attempts by private actors, typically political
campaigns, to temporarily privatize a traditional public
forum by obtaining a permit to use a park for an event have
drawn mixed judicial responses. 369 During such events, the
campaign committee typically treats the park as private
property and excludes dissidents or limits admittance to the
venue to those who do not support the campaign's
opponent. 37 Two cases, both arising from a Republican
campaign rally using the public commons in an Ohio town,
demonstrate the split in authority concerning these
viewpoint discrimination-meets-privatization schemes.
In Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville,371 the
campaign committee for then-President George H. W. Bush
obtained a permit to use a park for a campaign rally and
A
restrict entrance to those holding tickets to the event.
each
guarded
agent
Service
Secret
a
and
police officer
entrance to the fenced-off park, requiring entrants to set
aside any signs whether favorable or unfavorable to the
366 ACLUofNev., 333 F.3d at 1097.

See supra Part V.C.2.
See supra Part V.C.1.
See generally O'Neill, supra note 82, at 459-62.
370
Id. at 459.
371 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
372 Tickets generally were made available to whomever wanted them.
Id. at 1211-12.
367
368
369
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campaign. 373 The plaintiffs entered with concealed signs
criticizing Bush's AIDS policy. When they displayed the
signs, a brouhaha ensued, resulting in their ejection from
374

the park and arrest on various misdemeanor charges.
The Schwitzgebel court found that, despite the issuance of
the permit, the park was a traditional public forum and the
government could not convert it into something less
protective of free speech.375 The court noted:
In essence, public fora serve as bulwarks
protecting the right of all persons, especially
those who have no access to any other
outlet, to speak their minds freely. Courts
must not allow the government to overcome
the bastions protecting such an important
right through so simple an exercise as the
granting of a permit.376

The court found that when a permitted event, the
admittance to which is restricted to ticket-holders, is held at
a public park, the park retains its public forum status.
Nonetheless, the court upheld the exclusion of the plaintiffs
from the event by applying what Professor O'Neill
characterizes as a "tortured time, place, and manner
analysis." 377 Following Saunders v. United States, 378 the
Schwitzgebel court found a significant government interest
in preventing, by use of the permitting scheme, an
individual from physically intruding on and interfering with
another's event to inject his or her own beliefs. 379 Through
Id. at 1212. The campaign provided its own signs for participants to
use during the rally.
374 The charges were later dropped. Id. at 1212-13.
375
Id. at 1216.
171

376 i.

377 O'Neill, supra note 82, at 461 n.262.
378 518 F. Supp. 728, 729-30 (D.D.C. 1981), affd without op., 679 F.2d

262
379 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1218.
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its ruling, the court also sought to avoid "cacophony" by
3 80
barring opponents from holding events in the public fora.

The court's reasoning, however, flies in the face of the
Supreme Court's recognition of the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' 381 and that
free debate may carry with it "verbal tumult, discord, and
even offensive utterance." 382 Thus, the Schwitzgebel
court's justification for using a permit system to stifle
dissent lacks validity. Essentially, the government is using
a privatization scheme to do an end-run around the First
Amendment's ban on viewpoint discrimination 383 by
handing a traditional public forum to a private entity that
discriminates. Courts should not countenance this practice.
If the Schwitzgebel court came to an improper result
even while reaching the proper finding that permitting the
use of a park does not strip the park of public forum status,
then the court in Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville384 failed
even to reach an appropriate finding. In Sistrunk, a high
school student was required to surrender her button
showing support for Bill Clinton before entering a Bush
0 Id. at 1219. In deciding that the permitting scheme was a valid time,
place, or manner restriction on the plaintiffs, the court found contentneutrality because the issuance of the permit was not based on content
of the speech involved in the event; once issued, the permit could be
enforced "in a way that protects the expression of the permitted
message, even to the exclusion of some other message." Id. However,
the court here is allowing a governmental agency to issue a permit on a
content-neutral basis that gives an entity the ability to take over a
public forum and exclude speech on the basis of content in that public
forum. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (holding that a state may regulate
expressive content "only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest").
381 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
Within established limits, the court
382 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
added that these effects are "in truth necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to
achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony
is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength." Id. at 25.
383 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
4 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996).
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rally. The court, analogizing the case with Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,385 found that
the Bush campaign had a right to exclude the student's
button because allowing her to wear it would
unconstitutionally deprive the campaign of autonomy over
its message. 3 86 In Hurley, the Supreme Court enunciated
the principle underlying the Sistrunk court's decision when
it ruled that Massachusetts could not require Boston war
veteran parade organizers to include a gay-rights group that
would have imparted a message in discord with what the
organizers sought to communicate. 387 The Sistrunk court
likened the plaintiff in that case to the gay-rights group and
the campaign to the veterans, reasoning that compelling the
Bush campaign to allow the plaintiff to attend its rally
wearing a Clinton button would be analogous to requiring
the veterans group to permit gay-rights activists to march in
the Boston parade. The court stated this would be the same
because "participating in the rally as a member of the
audience is more akin to marching
in the parade itself as
'3 °
one of the less visible marchers. 8
The Sistrunk dissent contended that this analysis
"turned the narrow holding of Hurley on its head. 389
According to the dissent, the Sistrunk plaintiff's attendance
at the rally was not akin to marching in the parade, but to
standing in the crowd lining the parade route; marching in
the parade, instead, is equivalent to standing at the podium
and speaking at the rally. 390 The dissent in Sistrunk
promotes the better view because an audience member at a
U.S. 557 (1995).
Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 199.
387
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559, 574.
388 Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 199.
The court further supported the
proposition that the campaign could exclude dissenting voices from the
public forum that they occupied by finding that the campaign sought
attendees to "send the media a message" that Bush was going to win
385 515
386

the election. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
389 I. at 200 (Spiegel, J., dissenting).
3

9oId. at 201.
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rally wearing a campaign opponent's button or even
carrying a sign has no more effect on the message the
speaker at the podium conveys than a dissenter standing
along a parade route, who is part of the parade's
audience. 39 More significantly, the fundamental question
in Sistrunk was "how much control over a traditional public
forum may a municipality cede to a private group." 392 The
Strongsville, Ohio campaign rally cases, thus, present an
intriguing question of whether, in temporarily privatizing a
public forum by issuing a permit to a political speaker, a
governmental entity is able to turn the public forum into a
location allowing viewpoint discrimination. Considering
the extent to which courts protect free expression in the
public fora and the proposition that "the nature of certain
public forums cannot be altered, either by government fiat
or private will, 393394the answer to this question should be a
resounding "No."
id.
Id. at 202. The record was not sufficient to determine this issue.
393Id. (quoting Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84, No. 86-3287, 1987 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6669, at * 6 (6th Cir. May 22, 1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
394 To be fair, limiting speech-making in a public forum with the
391 See
392

purpose of facilitating simultaneous expression of views by groups
hostilely opposed to one another-as opposed to merely handing a
public forum to proponents of one point of view by the act of granting a
permit to use a park, as was the case in Sistrunk and Schwitzgebelmay be more readily justified. For example, in Grider v. Abramson,
994 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ky. 1998), Louisville, Kentucky authorities
used fencing and a buffer zone to separate simultaneous rallies by the
Ku Klux Klan and an opposing group in a downtown public park and
the adjacent courthouse steps. Id. at 841-43. The purpose was to
ensure that each group could express views "violently opposed" to the
other, within sight of the other, while reasonably secure that violence
would not break out. Id. at 843, 848. The plaintiffs challenged the
safety regime, in part, because it barred anyone besides scheduled
speakers from making a speech. Id. at 843. The court upheld this
provision, reasoning that the state should guarantee citizens "the right
to participate in events or demonstrations of their own choosing
without being subjected to interference by other citizens." Sanders v.
United States, 518 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D.D.C. 1981). This limit on
speech-making is more justifiable than the limits upheld in Sistrunk and
Schwitzgebel because its purpose was to facilitate the simultaneous
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Fortunately, a more recent case, Parks v. City of
Columbus,395 rejected the denial of First Amendment
speech in a public forum that was temporarily privatized.
The court distinguished the facts in that case from those in
Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel because the event for which a
public forum was privatized did not convey any particular
message. 396 In Parks, the city issued a permit to the Arts
Council to close a city street to vehicular traffic for an arts
festival that was free and open to the public.3 97 As the
plaintiff walked on the city street during the arts festival
wearing a sign bearing a religious message and distributing
literature, a fully-uniformed off-duty police officer who
was hired to provide security told him that the event
sponsors "did not want him there" and threatened to arrest
the plaintiff if he did not leave. 398 The court found state
expression of deeply disparate views, the kind of "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open" debate that the First Amendment, at its core, protects.
See id. at 848 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270) (internal quotation
marks omitted). One court indicated that when a governmental entity
grants a private entity the use of a public forum, the private entity's
right to constrain speech and have such constraints enforced by the
governmental entity should be limited to situations where the restricted
speech is disruptive. Garthright v. City of Portland, 315 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1105 (D. Or. 2004). This reflects reasonable thinking, so long as
it is applied to speech-making that actually disrupts. Merely wearing a
button or holding a sign while standing mute in a public forum that was
temporarily privatized (as was the case in Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel,
respectively) should not be considered disruptive under such a doctrine.
...
396 395 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 651. The court concluded:
While it is unclear that the Arts Festival was actually
expressing a particular message, the City "submitted that the
collective message of the Greater Columbus Arts Council is to
bring visual and performing artists to the City to be enjoyed by
those who wish to go to the festival." This is not an
expressive message, but merely a purpose for the event. The
Arts Festival is an event that most likely has many artists who
are expressing various messages of their own.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
397
398

Id. at 645.
Id. at 646.
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action on the part of the city and concluded that "it [was]
difficult to conceive that Parks's removal was based on
something other than the content of his speech. 399
Because the restriction was content-based, the city had to
show that its action was "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.", 40 0 The city failed to make such showing because it
had "not offered an interest, let alone a compelling one, to
explain why it prohibited Parks from exercising his First
Amendment rights in a traditional public forum." 4 0 1
VI. Conclusion
In its frenzied rush to fortify its bellicose foreign
policy, the government in recent years has turned a cold
shoulder not only towards dissenters, but the teachings of
earlier generations of American jurists. Not all modem
thinkers are guilty of following this trend, however. As a
New York judge recently noted, "We have long since made
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
citizens.,, 40 2 Even-and especially-in wartime, the search

for truth carried out through unbridled political expression
and robust debate is critical to the continued political
freedom of the nation. According to Justice Harlan:
The constitutional right of free expression is
powerful medicine in a society as diverse
'99 Id. at 654.
400

Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
401 Parks, 395 F.3d at 654. "The City offered no explanation as to why
the sponsor wanted the [plaintiff] removed. There is no evidence that
the Arts Council had a blanket prohibition on the distribution of
literature or that others engaging in similar constitutionally protected
activity were removed from the permitted area." Id.
402 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 603 (2004) (citing Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
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and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the
hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry
and more perfect polity and in the belief that
no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice
40 3
upon which our political system rests.
Concomitant with the right of free expression is the
right to gather in public places to give voice to political
views in order to convey them to authorities. 4°4 In modem
times, however, authorities demean public gathering for the
expression of political views because they assume that such
gatherings will take a violent form, thus presuming guilt
until innocence is proven. 40 5 Ironically, it can be argued
that the greater the constraints the government places on
dissidents through penning protesters, discriminating by
viewpoint, and privatizing away the public forum, the
greater the likelihood of civil disobedience to express views
the public otherwise would have voiced lawfully. 40 6 Yet,
along with the general perils inherent in civil disobedience
comes a newer, harsher threat of lengthy incarceration in
federal penitentiaries should the government choose to
employ section 802 of the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and
403

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.

"The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."
Cruikshank,92 U.S. at 552.
405 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
406 Id. at *44 ("closing off of space to protest has made civil
disobedience all the more necessary").
404
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407
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the "Patriot Act")
This prospect is no flight of
against40 8demonstrators.
fancy.
The government has already so compromised the
free use of the public forum that the only way to take it
back may be through widespread civil disobedience. But
because such a course would put many in danger, and
because, in a civilized democracy, the citizenry should not
have to resort to such extremes to engage in speech activity
the Constitution already protects, a better course would be
to rethink current policy toward those who use public
places to express their political views. Courts, no doubt,
have a significant role to play in this process and should
remain astute to governmental attempts to displace
dissidents by restricting access to the public forum.
Specifically, courts should be particularly wary of and
should treat with great suspicion schemes that: (1) corral or
pen protesters so they effectively are unable to get their
message across to the targets of their speech; (2)
discriminate according to viewpoint by banishing
opponents of government policies to distant or unseen
locations; and (3) propose to accomplish, through
privatization what the First Amendment otherwise would
not permit. By remaining vigilantly against such free
expression-compromising schemes, courts can hold the
other two branches of government to a constitutional
standard so that the people of this country may reclaim the
public forum.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272.
408 Section 802 of the Patriot Act reaches those who violate a criminal
law in the commission of an act dangerous to human life the purpose of
which is to influence government policy through intimidation or
coercion. See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 112-13
(Seven Stories Press 2002); Mitchell, supra note 11, at *44-*45.
407
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